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Abstract
This PhD thesis is a collection of three independent essays employing experimental
methods to investigate the links between moral behaviour and perception. Chapter
1 explores the role of image concerns in promise keeping. In our baseline treatments,
we use double dictator games which embed and vary opportunities for subjects to
hide their selfishness through self- and other-deception. Adding opportunities for
promise exchange, our data is consistent with social-image concerns as one motivator
of promise keeping. We find no evidence of subjects engaging in self-deception to
evade their promise-induced commitments. Chapter 2 explores motivated reasoning
in a context where third-party bystanders can prevent future norm transgressions.
For this purpose, we introduce the Third-Party Protection Game. In this game, a
third-party player can invest own resources to protect a passive player’s endowment
from being appropriated by a dictator. The game features uncertainty regarding
the degree of protection needed. We hypothesise that third-parties will report
conveniently biased, i.e., less cynical beliefs about dictators the costlier it is to
protect. Our data only provides moderate support. What we do find however is
that third-parties more generally and irrespective of the assigned cost overestimate
dictator generosity. Chapter 3 introduces the Costless Sharing Game (CSG). In
this game, a sharer first earns a resource by completing a task and is then offered
the opportunity to share the resource at no personal cost with a recipient. We use
the CSG to consider how sharing depends on moral reasoning based on entitlement
and desert (“intrinsic moral motivation”) and on whether the context of the sharer’s
decision is known by the recipient (“extrinsic social motivation”). We observe very
little reluctance to share. Interestingly, we also find mild evidence of a treatment
interaction which suggests less sharing when neither intrinsic moral nor extrinsic
social arguments for sharing are present.
ii
Access Condition and Agreement 
 
Each deposit in UEA Digital Repository is protected by copyright and other intellectual property rights, 
and duplication or sale of all or part of any of the Data Collections is not permitted, except that material 
may be duplicated by you for your research use or for educational purposes in electronic or print form. 
You must obtain permission from the copyright holder, usually the author, for any other use. Exceptions 
only apply where a deposit may be explicitly provided under a stated licence, such as a Creative 
Commons licence or Open Government licence. 
 
Electronic or print copies may not be offered, whether for sale or otherwise to anyone, unless explicitly 
stated under a Creative Commons or Open Government license. Unauthorised reproduction, editing or 
reformatting for resale purposes is explicitly prohibited (except where approved by the copyright holder 
themselves) and UEA reserves the right to take immediate ‘take down’ action on behalf of the copyright 
and/or rights holder if this Access condition of the UEA Digital Repository is breached. Any material in 
this database has been supplied on the understanding that it is copyright material and that no quotation 
from the material may be published without proper acknowledgement. 
 
Contents
List of Figures vi
List of Tables vii
Acknowledgements viii
Introduction 1
Chapter 1: Exploring Image Motivation in Promise Keeping 4
1.1 Introduction . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 5
1.2 Related Literature . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 6
1.2.1 Promise Keeping . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 6
1.2.2 Social-Image Concerns . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 8
1.2.3 Self-Image Concerns . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 9
1.3 The Experiment . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 10
1.3.1 Design . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 10
1.3.2 Hypotheses . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 16
1.3.2.1 Social-Image Concerns . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 17
1.3.2.2 Self-Image Concerns . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 18
1.3.3 Procedures . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 19
1.4 Results . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 19
1.4.1 Communication Contents . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 20
1.4.2 Communication Effects . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 20
1.4.2.1 Social-Image Effects . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 21
1.4.2.2 Self-Image Effects . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 25
1.5 Discussion . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 28
1.6 Conclusion . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 30
Appendix for Chapter 1 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 31
1.A Supplementary Data . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 31
1.A.1 Cut-offs and Task Performance . . . . . . . . . . . . 31
1.A.2 Regression Results . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 32
iii
Contents
1.B Instructions and Screens . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 33
1.B.1 Main Treatment Instructions . . . . . . . . . . . . . 33
1.B.2 Practice Stage Screens . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 37
1.B.3 Control Questions . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 45
1.B.4 Control Treatment Instructions . . . . . . . . . . . . 47
1.B.5 Revelation of Cut-off Details . . . . . . . . . . . . . 50
Chapter 2: Third-Party Intervention and Perception Manipulation 51
2.1 Introduction . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 52
2.2 Related Literature . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 53
2.2.1 Third-Party Intervention . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 53
2.2.2 Perception Manipulation . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 55
2.3 Experiment 1 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 57
2.3.1 Design . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 57
2.3.2 Hypotheses . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 60
2.3.3 Procedures . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 61
2.3.4 Results . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 62
2.3.4.1 Protection Behaviour . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 62
2.3.4.2 Beliefs about the Claim . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 64
2.4 Experiment 2 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 67
2.4.1 Design . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 67
2.4.2 Procedures . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 68
2.4.3 Results . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 68
2.5 General Discussion . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 70
2.6 Conclusion . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 71
Appendix for Chapter 2 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 72
2.A Sequential Game Comparison . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 72
2.B Instructions and Screens . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 72
2.B.1 Experiment 1 Instructions . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 72
2.B.2 Example Round Screens . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 77
2.B.3 Control Questions . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 85
2.B.4 Experiment 2 Instructions . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 87
2.B.5 Strategy Method Example Screens . . . . . . . . . . 92
iv
Contents
Chapter 3: Costless Sharing, Moral Entitlements and Perception 93
3.1 Introduction . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 94
3.2 Related Literature . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 95
3.2.1 Dictator Game Giving . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 95
3.2.2 Costless Sharing . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 96
3.3 The Experiment . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 97
3.3.1 Design . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 97
3.3.2 Hypotheses . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 99
3.3.2.1 Intrinsic Moral Motivation . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 99
3.3.2.2 Extrinsic Social Motivation . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 99
3.3.3 Procedures . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 99
3.4 Results . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 100
3.4.1 Main Results . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 100
3.4.2 Supplementary Results . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 102
3.5 Discussion . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 104
3.6 Conclusion . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 105
Appendix for Chapter 3 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 106




Figure 1.1: Sequence of Stages in the Experiment . . . . . . . . . . . . . 11
Figure 1.2: Calibrated Cut-off Distribution . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 13
Figure 1.3: Proportions of Generous Choices between Treatments . . . . 23
Figure 1.4: Cumulative Distribution Functions of Success Times . . . . . 26
Figure 1.5: Average Times Taken per Task . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 27
Figure 2.1: Player C’s Decision Screen . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 58
Figure 2.2: Belief Elicitation Screen . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 60
Figure 2.3: Average Protection Behaviour by Treatment and Role Order . 62
Figure 2.4: Beliefs and Protection Behaviour by Treatment . . . . . . . . 64
Figure 2.5: Average Beliefs by Treatment and Role Order . . . . . . . . . 65
Figure 2.6: Distributions of Beliefs and Empirical Claims . . . . . . . . . 66
Figure 2.7: Player C’s Decision Screen for Scenario 1 . . . . . . . . . . . 68
Figure 3.1: Distributions of Tokens Shared . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 101
Figure 3.2: Distributions of Tokens Shared (Reduced Sample) . . . . . . 104
vi
List of Tables
Table 1.1: Factorial Treatment Design . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 10
Table 1.2: Belief Elicitation . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 15
Table 1.3: Overview of Message Profiles by Treatment . . . . . . . . . . 20
Table 1.4: Summary Statistics . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 22
Table 1.5: Success Times and Accuracy in the Matrix Task . . . . . . . . 25
Table 1.6: Random Effects Panel Model Estimations . . . . . . . . . . . 28
Table A.1: Cut-offs and Task Performance . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 31
Table A.2: Regression Results . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 32
Table 2.1: Summary Statistics for Experiment 1 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 63
Table 2.2: Summary Statistics for Experiment 2 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 69
Table 2.3: Random Effects Tobit Model Estimations . . . . . . . . . . . 69
Table 3.1: Factorial Treatment Design . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 98
Table 3.2: Summary Statistics of Tokens Shared . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 100
Table 3.3: Classification of Written Explanations . . . . . . . . . . . . . 102
Table 3.4: Control Question Attempts . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 103
Table 3.5: Summary Statistics of Tokens Shared (Reduced Sample) . . . 103
vii
Acknowledgements
I am indebted to many people who have supported me during this challenging yet
exciting and very rewarding process of writing this thesis. First of all, I want
to thank my advisors Prof. Robert Sugden, Dr. Anders Poulsen and Dr. Odile
Poulsen for giving me the freedom to pursue my own research interests and for the
numerous discussions we had over the years which improved my work and made
me a better thinker. Bob, you are one of the smartest and kindest people I know;
thank you for your guidance and encouragement. Anders, thank you for your advice,
encouragement and for involving me in many exciting research projects. Odile, thank
you for your interest and the insightful comments you made on early drafts of my
work; chapter 3 of this thesis is dedicated to you and your daughter Eva.
I particularly want to thank my friends in the PGR community and beyond for
being there for me when I needed it and for having made my stay in the U.K. such
an unforgettable experience. I share memories with you that will last for a lifetime.
The unconditional support of my family helped me to keep going and to stay
focused. I thank my mother and my brother for always having my back, I can’t
express how much this means to me.
Finally, I want to thank the School of Economics as well as the attendees of
numerous seminars and conferences for their feedback on my work. I am also grateful
to Prof. Christoph Vanberg and Dr. Amrish Patel for kindly accepting to serve as
discussants of this thesis.
Kevin Grubiak




Insights from behavioural and experimental economics have enriched the way we
think about humans, their objectives and the process of decision making. As a
graduate student, I got excited reading about human psychology and the behavioural
relevance of social preferences which stood in sharp contrast to a model of behaviour
based on rationality and pure self-regard. Subjects in carefully designed experiments
were often times altruistic and seemed to care about notions of fairness, reciprocity,
intentions, or norm compliance. A recent literature has challenged these findings by
demonstrating that many subjects are reluctantly pro-social, i.e. they pursue moral
objectives for extrinsic reasons such as pride, guilt and shame, but cease to do so
when such incentives are removed. What motivates behaviour in such instances is
not morality per se, but the desire of being perceived as a moral person. A lot of
the evidence on perception concerns stems from dictator game studies which focus
on testing the robustness of a distributional fairness norm. It is important not to
stop here however, and to assess the extent to which perception concerns play a
role in explaining the strength of other norms frequently found to be behaviourally
important; this is the objective of my thesis. I present an analysis of three novel
experiments, each dealing with the relevance of perception concerns applied to a
different morally demanding context.
I use perception concerns as an umbrella term subsuming two distinct factors that
may matter for behaviour: social-image concerns and self-image concerns. Whereas
in the former case, behaviour is expected to depend on how others perceive a given
action, in the latter case what matters is how actions reflect on a decision-maker’s
self-perception. The standard approach of manipulating social-image concerns in the
lab involves comparing treatments where other subjects are fully informed about a
decision maker’s actions and the associated consequences with treatments where no
such information is provided. Self-image concerns, on the other hand, are distinct
in that they don’t require observers to be present. One could think of the decision
maker as being his or her own observer and internal assessor of behaviour. Under
this perspective, seemingly moral actions may be the result of subjects avoiding
having to send a signal about their type that would threaten their self-image. One
way of mitigating such concerns is to engage in motivated reasoning or self-deception
which can be tested for in the lab.
In chapter 1, I investigate the role of image concerns in promise keeping using
a lab experiment. The experiment I designed allows to test for both self-image and
social-image concerns in a unified framework. In my baseline treatment, I combine a
1
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double dictator game with an effort task that has to be completed successfully for the
dictator to be able to decide between a self-regarding and a generous allocation. If a
subject fails to complete the task, the computer implements a random allocation
between the two alternative allocations. Importantly, the task is subject to a
random cut off mechanism which may prevent subjects from completing the task
on time in which case the decision is delegated to the computer. Recipients do not
learn whether a decision was made by the dictator or the computer. This design
feature is a modification of the “plausible deniability” mechanism introduced by
Dana, Weber and Kuang (2007) and allows me to measure whether subjects work
reluctantly, or procrastinate, on the task to delegate their decision to the computer.
Such procrastination (which is measured in relation to a control treatment where
we remove incentives for procrastination) is in line with a self-deceptive strategy
according to which subjects pretend to be interested in solving the task, but do
so half-heartedly in the hope of obtaining the self-regarding allocation through the
computer. Promise keeping enters the picture by adding a pre-play communication
stage to the baseline treatment which allows subjects to exchange pre-formulated
promises about their intent to solve the task and to choose the generous allocation.
A comparison of response times and task accuracy between treatments with and
without communication is then indicative of whether or not subjects were reluctant
to live up to their promise-induced commitments. To shed light on the social-image
dimension, I also add treatments where recipients are able to infer whether an
allocation came about by the dictator or the computer. This completes my 2x2
design. My results show that social-image concerns matter for promise keeping.
Still, I find significant promise keeping rates even when actions are deniable and
no evidence of subjects engaging in self-deception to evade their promise-induced
commitments. This could be interpreted as corroborating evidence of the strength
of promises.
In chapter 2, I investigate the relevance of motivated reasoning in a context where
third-parties or bystanders can intervene to prevent future norm transgressions.
For this purpose, I introduce the Third-Party Protection Game and implement
it in the lab. In this game, a third-party player can invest own resources to
protect another passive player’s endowment from being appropriated by a dictator.
Importantly, the third-party has to decide on the level of protection ex-ante, i.e.
before the required level of protection – as determined by the dictator’s decision – is
revealed. The question I pose is: will third-parties exploit the inherent uncertainty
about the dictator’s behaviour in a self-serving way and convince themselves that
a norm transgression is unlikely or less severe? I elicit third-parties’ beliefs about
dictator behaviour and provide significant incentives for accurate beliefs. To check
for evidence of distorted beliefs, I follow a strategy introduced by Di Tella et al.
(2015) whereby a decision maker (in this case, the third-party) is privately informed
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of their assignment to one of two (protection) cost conditions: low cost vs. high
cost. Since the cost assignment is private knowledge to third-parties and dictators
are kept uninformed, third-party beliefs about dictator behaviour should not differ
systematically between treatments. In contrast, if third-parties entertain beliefs
which are motivated by a desire to avoid costly protection, these beliefs may reflect
less cynicism the costlier it is for third-parties to protect. What I find are differences
in beliefs between the two cost conditions in the direction hypothesised by motivated
beliefs; these differences however only reach mild significance. I however do observe
that beliefs matter and that third-parties, more generally and irrespective of the
assigned cost condition, expect dictators to be less selfish than they really are. This
suggests an ability of policy makers to affect behaviour in the field by disseminating
more accurate information about the severity of norm transgressions.
In chapter 3, I present the results of an online experiment jointly designed with
Anders Poulsen, Mengjie Wang and Jiwei Zheng. The online implementation of
the experiment was a consequence of the social distancing requirements associated
with the Covid-19 pandemic which made us deviate from our initial intention to
run the experiment in the physical lab. For an excellent discussion of the pros and
cons of running experiments in the physical lab versus online we refer the reader
to an article by Horton, Rand and Zeckhauser (2011). We couldn’t identify any
relevant limitations from moving our experiment online. On the contrary, we liked
the online version on the grounds that it made the experimenter-subject anonymity
of our experiment more credible. The experiment introduced the Costless Sharing
Game where a sharer first earns an endowment by completing an effort task and is
then offered the opportunity to share the resource at no personal cost with another
person, the recipient. We think that the empirical relevance of costless sharing is
significant; examples include emailing presentation slides, sharing documents, and
more generally sharing valuable information, knowledge, and advice with someone
else. To our knowledge, very little is known about people’s willingness to share
when resources are excludable but non-rival. We use the Costless Sharing Game to
consider how the amount shared depends on moral reasoning based on entitlement
and desert (“intrinsic moral motivation”) and on whether the context of the decision
of the sharer is known by the recipient (“extrinsic social motivation”). Similar to
Cappelen et al. (2017), we manipulate the first channel by comparing treatments
where recipients are passive with treatments where recipients had to successfully
complete the same task that gave rise to the sharer’s resource. We manipulate the
second channel by varying the information that recipients receive about the context
and decision of the sharer. This completes our 2x2 design. Our results suggest very
little reluctance to share. Interestingly, we also find mild evidence of an interaction
between our treatment conditions which indicates less sharing when neither intrinsic
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Chapter 1: Exploring Image Motivation in Promise Keeping
1.1 Introduction
Trust plays an important role in many economic interactions. It is a prerequisite
for interactions where legal contracts are not enforceable or simply too expensive to
implement. Moreover, trust can provide substantial efficiency gains, for instance, by
speeding up the process of decision making. Despite its potential benefits, however,
trust carries the risk of betrayal.
Yet, abundant evidence documents that people are far more trustworthy than
the standard economic model resting on the assumption of pure self-interest would
assert. Prominent explanations relate to intrinsic preferences for concepts like
fairness, equality, or reciprocity. But also factors like the ability to talk and exchange
promises have widely been observed to increase trust and trustworthiness. The
inclination to keep a promise can theoretically and empirically be accounted for by
the commitment-based (Vanberg, 2008) as well as the expectations-based (Charness
and Dufwenberg, 2006) explanations. According to the former, people keep their
promises because they have an intrinsic preference for keeping their word. According
to the latter, promises are kept because they induce a shift in promisee expectations
and, thus, higher experienced guilt by the promise maker. Although these theories
are not mutually exclusive, follow-up research has used ever more sophisticated
experimental protocols in an attempt to cleanly distinguish between these two
motivations of promise keeping (e.g., Vanberg, 2008; Schwartz, Spires and Young,
2019; Bhattacharya and Sengupta, 2016; Ederer and Stremitzer, 2017; Ismayilov and
Potters, 2016; Mischkowski, Stone and Stremitzer, 2019; Di Bartolomeo et al., 2019).
Although guilt aversion appears to play a significant role, promises are frequently
kept even when guilt is ruled out as an explanation. On balance, these studies
provide remarkable support of both an intrinsic preference and guilt aversion in
promise keeping.
In contrast to the cited literature, our study does not aim to assess the empirical
relevance of these competing theories of promise keeping. Instead, in the current
paper we explore the relevance of alternative and understudied reasons for honouring
one’s word, namely image concerns. We say that a decision maker is concerned
about his or her image if he or she experiences a disutility from being perceived in a
negative light either by other individuals (social-image concern) or by him- or herself
(self-image concern). Although there is a well-established literature documenting
that these types of concerns indeed affect decision making in a variety of morally
demanding contexts (Gino, Norton and Weber (2016); see also sections 1.2.2 and
1.2.3 for a detailed review of the respective literatures), very little is known about
its particular relevance in the domain of promise keeping.
Two studies which address the social-image hypothesis in promise keeping are
Deck, Servátka and Tucker (2013) and Schütte and Thoma (2014). Both report
5
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a null result. As acknowledged by the authors themselves however, their lack of
an effect could be due to the high rates of cooperation that both observe in their
baseline conditions, consequently “leaving little room for incremental improvement
in cooperation” (Deck, Servátka and Tucker, 2013, p. 598). Our paper contributes
to this strand of the literature by documenting a positive result in an experiment
where such “ceiling effects” are minimised.
The second contribution of our paper lies in its test of self-image concerns in
promise keeping. To the best of our knowledge, all studies on promise keeping make
it perfectly transparent to the promisor that he or she is responsible for a broken
promise. In reality however, people can often excuse their behaviour in ways which
allow them to preserve their self-image e.g. by shifting responsibility for outcomes
to external circumstances. It turns out that our test of self-image concerns yields a
null result: we find no evidence of subjects engaging in self-deception to evade their
promise-induced commitments which could be interpreted as corroborating evidence
of the strength of promises.
The remainder of this paper is structured as follows. Section 1.2 reviews the
related literatures in more detail. Section 1.3 elaborates on the experimental design,
the hypotheses and the procedures of our experiment. In Section 1.4 we present the
results. Section 1.5 contains a discussion. Section 1.6 concludes the analysis.
1.2 Related Literature
Our study connects two strands of the literature which, by and large, have only
been considered in isolation from each other: the literatures on promise keeping
and on image concerns. In this section, we review each respective literature and
outline how a joint perspective could improve our understanding of the effectiveness
of non-binding verbal commitments.
1.2.1 Promise Keeping
Although standard economic theory discards an influence of pre-play communication
on behaviour, numerous studies have documented that communication, in particular
the use of promises, can substantially increase cooperation. Unaccounted for by the
standard approach, people may be averse to lying or dislike letting others down on
what they promised them they would do, which may eventually render cheap talk
credible.
In a seminal paper, Charness and Dufwenberg (2006) introduce a hidden-action
trust game with pre-play communication and find that promises significantly increase
cooperation. The cooperative strategy profile occurred 20% of the time without
communication and 50% of the time with communication. The authors argue that
6
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their results square well with a model of guilt aversion by which promises feed
expectations which the promisor dislikes to violate (expectations-based explanation).
Yet, a popular alternative explanation of their results is that people may hold an
intrinsic preference for keeping their word (commitment-based explanation). A series
of papers have been dedicated to disentangling these two explanations of promise
keeping. The first of which, Vanberg (2008), uses a variant of the hidden-action
trust game where subjects are informed that there is a 50% chance that they will
be re-matched to a different subject than the one they previously communicated
with. Only the promisor is informed whether his or her partner was switched and
he or she is allowed to inspect the message that this new partner has received
earlier, before the switch occurred (hence, the promisor knows whether or not a
promise was received). From the perspective of the promisee who is unaware whether
or not a switch occurred, first-order beliefs about the promisor’s trustworthiness
should not differ across conditions. Anticipating this, the promisor’s second-order
belief and hence the guilt potentially experienced should not differ either. Holding
second-order beliefs constant, Vanberg finds that a dictator’s own promise affects
behaviour whereas a promise that was made by others does not.1 He argues that
this result appears to be incompatible with the expectations-based explanation of
promise keeping and lends support to the commitment-based explanation.
Ederer and Stremitzer (2017) claim that the lack of evidence of guilt aversion in
promise keeping observed by Vanberg (2008) may result from the possibility that
guilt is only experienced if one is directly responsible for inducing an increase in
the expectations of a promisee. Recall that in Vanberg’s experiment, the increase
in expectations in the control condition is induced by another dictator’s promise,
while expectations are affected by the dictator’s own promise in the main condition.
The authors use an “unreliable random device” to generate exogenous variation
in second-order beliefs and provide evidence of guilt aversion in promise keeping.
However, as their design does not include an analogue to Vanberg’s partner-switching
mechanism, they cannot assess the strength of the expectations-based explanation
relative to the strength of the commitment-based explanation.
In a unified framework, Di Bartolomeo et al. (2019) study an environment that
allows for exogenous variation of both promises and expectations allowing them
to test which channel is quantitatively more important. They essentially combine
the earlier designs by Vanberg (2008) and Ederer and Stremitzer (2017). More
precisely, they make the partner-switching probability in Vanberg’s design a separate
treatment variable that randomly takes the value low (25%) or high (75%) to
generate exogenous variation in expectations. Their results suggest that promise
keeping is independent of beliefs. Promise keeping rates are as high when beliefs are
1Dictators who promised chose the cooperative outcome 73% of the time whereas those who
did not promise chose it 52% of the time.
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low (as induced by a high switch probability) as when beliefs are high (as induced
by a low switch probability). Nonetheless, they observe an independent effect of
higher expectations on cooperation as predicted by guilt aversion.
The overall picture documents that (i) the use of promises is a powerful way of
increasing cooperation and efficiency and (ii) that its effect is mediated by both an
intrinsic preference for promise keeping and guilt aversion. Yet, another motivation
for promise keeping which has received little attention so far is image motivation.2
1.2.2 Social-Image Concerns
Social-image concerns relate to people’s concerns over how their actions are perceived
by others. A well-established literature has documented that choices depend on
observability (see e.g. Andreoni and Petrie, 2004; Andreoni and Bernheim, 2009;
Ariely, Bracha and Meier, 2009; Bohnet and Frey, 1999; Bursztyn and Jensen, 2017;
Chaudhuri, 2011; Dana, Cain and Dawes, 2006; Ekström, 2012; Fehr and Gächter,
2000; Rege, 2004; Rege and Telle, 2004; Soetevent, 2005; Tadelis, 2011). Altruistic
behaviour in the well-known dictator game, for instance, has been shown to be
sensitive to the possibility that the experimenter could infer choices (Hoffman et al.,
1994; Hoffman, McCabe and Smith, 1996) and many studies have documented that
what looks like giving can often be better classified as giving-in to social pressure
(Cain, Dana and Newman, 2014).
In situations where people are directly confronted with pro-social requests, many
follow reluctantly to avoid the feeling of shame. A reluctance to enter sharing
environments has been observed in several field and laboratory studies. In a door-to-
door fundraising study, DellaVigna, List and Malmendier (2012) find that informing
households about an upcoming donation request significantly reduces the share of
households opening the door. Dana, Cain and Dawes (2006) as well as Lazear,
Malmendier and Weber (2012) document the same pattern in laboratory experiments
where subjects are willing to (silently) sort-out of a dictator game at a cost.
Rather recently, scholars have started to investigate the robustness of several
concepts which have previously been thought of as resulting from intrinsic preferences.
Malmendier, te Velde and Weber (2014) find that a preference for reciprocating
others’ kindness is weaker than previously thought when social pressure is accounted
for. Another example is presented by Kriss, Weber and Xiao (2016) who observe
that third-parties punish norm violators reluctantly, i.e., although they indicate a
preference for punishment, they ultimately avoid the act of punishing if excuses allow
them to do so without blame. Attributing responsibility to nature allows subjects
to maintain a positive image in the eyes of other subjects and the experimenter.
2There is an advanced literature connecting image motivation to lying and cheating (see e.g.
Mazar, Amir and Ariely, 2008; Greenberg, Smeets and Zhurakhovska, 2015; Hao and Houser, 2017;
Gneezy, Kajackaite and Sobel, 2018; Bicchieri, Dimant and Sonderegger, 2020).
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One of the aims of our paper is to assess the role that social-image concerns
play in promise keeping. We are only aware of few studies which have approached
this territory before us. Deck, Servátka and Tucker (2013) hypothesise that the
effectiveness of promises observed in earlier studies could partly be driven by subjects’
image concerns towards the experimenter. The authors however cannot conclude
this from their data because they could not replicate an effect of communication
on cooperation under both single-blind and double-blind payoff procedures; a result
which could be driven by ceiling effects as acknowledged by the authors. Schütte
and Thoma (2014), on the other hand, test for social-image concerns by varying the
ex-post observability of a promisor’s action and report a null result. Again, a ceiling
effect – this time stemming from the very high proportion of subjects keeping their
promise in their baseline condition (81%) – could have limited the scope for image
concerns to be detectable. Cadsby et al. (2015) find mixed evidence; they observe
identifiability to matter for promise keeping in China, not however in New Zealand.
Our paper adds to the aforementioned literature by presenting the results of an
experiment which is less susceptible to ceiling effects and which thereby provides a
new testing ground for the relevance of social-image concerns in promise keeping.
1.2.3 Self-Image Concerns
Distinct from social -image concerns as outlined before are self -image concerns.
People like to think of themselves as fair and honourable beings and where these
perceptions are at stake, as in the case of opportunistic temptation, so is their
self-concept. While psychologists have long recognised the importance of self-image
concerns (e.g., Baumeister et al., 1998; Bem, 1972; Fiske, 2018), economists have only
recently incorporated these concerns into what could be called “third-generation”
theories of moral behaviour. Theories of self-concept maintenance (Mazar, Amir and
Ariely, 2008), self-signalling (Bodner and Prelec, 2003; Bénabou and Tirole, 2004,
2006; Grossman and Van der Weele, 2017) and identity (Akerlof and Kranton, 2000,
2010; Bénabou and Tirole, 2011) have been able to organise findings unexplained
by standard theories of social preference. Identity management, in particular self-
deception, can explain why people avoid costless information (Dana, Weber and
Kuang, 2007), sort-out of morally demanding situations (Dana, Cain and Dawes,
2006; Lazear, Malmendier and Weber, 2012), trade off good deeds with bad deeds
(Mazar and Zhong, 2010; Merritt, Effron and Monin, 2010), or delegate the execution
of opportunistic decisions to third-parties (Hamman, Loewenstein and Weber, 2010).
The importance of self-image concerns is also emphasised in a seminal study by
Dana, Weber and Kuang (2007). In their “plausible deniability” treatment, a dictator
can choose between an allocation favouring him- or herself over the recipient, or an
equal and efficient allocation. The twist in this treatment is that the dictator can lose
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agency if he or she delays making a decision in which case the computer intervenes to
implement either outcome with equal chance. The recipient can never tell whether a
selfish outcome resulted from a wilful decision or an unlucky dictator. Interestingly,
delegating the choice to the computer is inconsistent with purely outcome-based
theories of behaviour because such delegation would imply that the dictator prefers
a lottery over two outcomes over each one separately. Self-image concerns, instead,
become a natural candidate for explaining dictators’ willingness to delegate the
decision. With 50% probability, the computer would choose the fair outcome the
dictator would have felt compelled to choose anyway, but otherwise the selfish
outcome would obtain and the dictator could maintain the illusion of not being
responsible for its implementation. Indeed, a substantial proportion of dictators
in their study (24%) allowed themselves to be cut off, thereby avoiding to make a
decision.3 The deniability mechanism has further been applied to the analysis of
reciprocal preferences e.g. by Van der Weele et al. (2014) and Regner (2018).
In our paper, we implement a variant of the cut-off mechanism to investigate the
relevance of self-image concerns in promise keeping. To the best of our knowledge,
all studies on promise keeping make it perfectly transparent to the decision maker
that he or she is responsible for a broken promise; put differently, promise breaking
is an act of commission. Yet, the responsibility for a broken promise can also be
shifted to external circumstances, thereby granting a decision maker a moral excuse
for selfish behaviour without compromising his or her self-image.
1.3 The Experiment
1.3.1 Design
We combine a binary dictator game with a matrix solving task and systematically
vary between subjects (i) the degree to which a “plausible deniability” mechanism
allows subjects to obfuscate responsibility for outcomes and (ii) whether or not the
experiment features a communication stage. Table 1.1 summarises our 2x2 factorial
treatment design. The sequence of stages in the experiment is depicted in Figure 1.1.
Table 1.1: Factorial Treatment Design
No Deniability Plausible Deniability
No Communication NC_ND NC_PD
Communication C_ND C_PD
3Note that the cut-off timer was calibrated in a way such that subjects who really wanted to
make a decision themselves had enough time to do so.
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Subjects are randomly paired in groups of two. Role assignment takes place
at the end of the experiment, i.e., all subjects simultaneously play as A players
(potential dictators) knowing that outcomes in this role would only count for half of
them whereas the other half would eventually serve the role of player B (recipient).4
All treatments have in common that the dictator game stage is only reached if
a preceding matrix task is solved successfully. In case of success, the subject enters
the dictator game stage and decides how to allocate money between him- or herself
and his or her counterpart by choosing one of two possible allocations: A=(£10,£0)
or B=(£6,£6). Conversely, in case of no success, the subject skips the dictator
game stage and is forced to let the computer randomly implement either of the two
allocations with equal probability on his or her behalf.
The matrix task, borrowed from Abeler et al. (2011), consists of subjects counting
ones (1s) in a series of 5x5 matrices comprised of randomly ordered zeros and ones.5
Importantly, we modified the task to feature a cut-off mechanism which (in some of
our treatments) can serve as a plausible excuse for the implementation of the selfish
allocation A (£10, £0).6 Successful completion requires a subject to solve a target
amount of 15 matrices on time, i.e. before being cut off by the computer.
We employ different variants of the cut-off mechanism in our experiment. In our
No Deniability (ND) treatments (Table 1.1, first column), subjects are given 300
seconds (5 minutes) to work on the task until a cut-off occurs. The time allotted
in these treatments is extremely generous based on the results of an informal and
unincentivised pretest where subjects needed on average 104s to solve 15 matrices
and no subject took longer than 138s. Our aim was to erase the opportunity of using
4In the instructions, we refer to “you” and “your counterpart” instead of “dictator” and
“recipient”. Instructions can be found in Appendix 1.B.
5Appendix 1.B.2 provides screenshots of the experimental interface.
6Recall that in Dana, Weber and Kuang (2007), 24% of the subjects allowed themselves to be
cut-off by the computer, thereby preferring a mixture of two outcomes over each one separately.
This observation is “inconsistent with a theory of rational choice with utilities defined only over
outcomes” (p. 74). For subjects who are feeling compelled to choose the other-regarding option in
order not to threaten their self-image, however, being cut off can be desirable. In half of the cases,
the outcome would obtain which the dictator would have felt compelled to choose anyway. In
another half of the cases, the opportunistic outcome would obtain allowing the subject to uphold
the illusion of not being responsible for its implementation.
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the cut-off mechanism as a plausible excuse for selfish allocations whilst keeping the
experimental protocol as close as possible to the treatments we describe next.
In our Plausible Deniability (PD) treatments (Table 1.1, second column), instead
of telling subjects that the cut-off would occur after 300 seconds sharp, we tell them
that the cut-off can occur at any randomly determined second within the 300 seconds
interval.7 The PD treatments offer room for two distinct dimensions of deniability:
Deniability towards the counterpart. Subjects can exploit the fact that their
counterpart cannot ascertain whether an outcome came about by a subject’s
own choice or by the computer. Our plausible deniability treatments therefore
alleviate the social-image cost that is usually associated with selfish behaviour
under full transparency.
Deniability towards the self. Subjects who feel compelled to choose the generous
allocation because they do not want to think badly of their selves may prefer
to be cut off by the computer. A cut-off results in a fair chance (50%) of
obtaining the opportunistic outcome whilst allowing to maintain the illusion
of not being responsible for its implementation.
We assumed that self-deceivers would work on the task half-heartedly, waste
time, or commit more errors all of which delaying the completion of the task.8 To
identify whether subjects in our PD treatments indeed procrastinated, an additional
control treatment was conducted. This treatment was designed as closely as possible
to the NC_PD treatment. The only difference was the absence of a counterpart.
In this treatment, successful completion of the matrix task allowed dictators to
choose their own payoff only (£10 or £6). Since any incentives for procrastination
were removed in this treatment, we aimed to obtain an unbiased distribution of
performances in the matrix task against which to compare performances in our
main treatments. Instructions for the control treatment can be found in Appendix
1.B.4.
No information was disclosed to subjects regarding the underlying distribution
that generated the cut-offs in our PD treatments (and the control). Whilst it
is technically true that a cut-off could occur anywhere within the specified time
interval, we used a distribution which favoured later cut-offs. To be precise, we
7If a cut-off occurred, a subject was asked to work on a follow-up task for the remainder of the
300 seconds. The task was not incentivised and consisted of adding up numbers on screen. The
purpose of this task was to maintain a constant sound of mouse clicks in the background, thereby
ruling out that subjects could infer from the lack of this sound information about the timing of
cut-offs of their peers.
8Previous studies which utilised a cut-off mechanism required self-deceivers to be passive and
to wait for the computer to intervene. We decided to embed our cut-off mechanism into a real
effort task instead of the dictator game itself to reduce potential demand effects and to mimic a
richer (and in our opinion, more realistic) environment that would allow subjects to hide their
intentions in an inconspicuous way, by disguising their true ability in an active task.
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combined a discretised normal distribution with a uniform distribution such that
cut-offs would be drawn from the function: f(x) = N (190, 20) +U{1, 300}.9 Figure
1.2 depicts the associated cumulative distribution function which illustrates the
probability of being cut off in the matrix task as a function of time. Dotted lines
mark the times that the average as well as the slowest subject took to successfully
complete the matrix task in the pretest. These times were used as benchmarks
for our calibration. We calibrated the cut-off distribution with the following two
objectives in mind:
Minimising data loss.
Early cut-offs are associated with data loss because neither is the time data of
a particular subject rich enough to identify procrastination nor do we obtain
choice data in the subsequent dictator game. To minimise data loss, our cut-off
distribution is shifted to the right. Recall that in the pretest, subjects needed
on average 104s to succeed in the matrix task. But even up to the 150 seconds
mark, the cumulative probability of being cut off in our experiment was merely
12% (after which it increased more rapidly).
Minimising selection effects.
Some of the hypotheses derived in Section 1.3.2 are tested by comparing
aggregate choice behaviour in the dictator game stage between our ND and PD
treatments. For these tests to be reliable, we have to rule out the possibility
9We refrained from shifting the distribution to the utmost right and added a uniformly
distributed element to it to preclude subjects from working out the underlying distribution ex-post
e.g. through communication with fellow participants.
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that our cut-off mechanism changed the composition of our PD compared to
our ND samples. This would be the case e.g. if one assumed cut off subjects
to be overly selfish or other-regarding. The shift of our cut-off distribution
was specifically motivated to handle this potential concern. Since, for most of
the cases, a cut-off would not occur until very late, we made it very difficult
for subjects to successfully self-deceive. A cut-off could only be enforced
through excessive procrastination which we assumed to be incompatible with
maintaining the perception of irresponsibility. Consequently, we expected most
subjects in our experiment to finish the task (with only few being cut off). In
Section 1.4.2 we confirm that this was indeed the case in our experiment.
On the second dimension of our factorial treatment design, we varied whether
subjects could communicate with their counterpart before entering the matrix solving
stage. In the communication stage, we allowed subjects to exchange pre-formulated
messages. Within a group, one subject was randomly chosen to send the first
message by choosing one of the following alternatives:
Message 1: “I promise to do my best to implement Option B, if you promise to do
the same.”
Message 2: “I don’t want to commit myself to anything.”
The second subject could then reply by choosing between:
Message 1: “I promise to do my best to implement Option B.”
Message 2: “I don’t want to commit myself to anything.”
Payoffs were calibrated providing an equality as well as total earnings maximising
argument in favour of option B(£6, £6) over the opportunistic option A(£10, £0).
We presumed that subjects would use the communication stage to exchange promises
as a means to achieve cooperation on the former allocation.
The experiment was designed such that our deniability manipulations took place
only after the communication stage had concluded. This means that, at the time
when subjects exchanged messages, they did not know whether they would be
assigned to the No Deniability or Plausible Deniability condition. It was only after
messages had been exchanged and the communication stage had concluded that
they learned which condition applied to them.10 By this means, we were able to
vary by treatment whether deniability was possible or not without systematically
influencing the content of exchanged messages.
10In the instructions, we only provide minimal information about the cut-off mechanism.
Subjects are told that additional details would follow in the later course of the experiment. After the
conclusion of the communication stage, treatment-specific details regarding the cut-off mechanism
were read out aloud by the experimenter. Scripts can be found in Appendix 1.B.5.
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By comparing the marginal effect of adding communication (and thereby promise
exchange) to our existing ND and PD conditions, our experiment allows to shed light
on the relevance of image concerns particular to promise keeping. We also collected
data on subjects’ beliefs about the behaviour and expectations of their counterpart
to investigate whether any observed effects of our treatment variables are correctly
anticipated by subjects to affect behaviour more generally. Subjects’ second-order
beliefs which serve as the conventional measure of guilt in the literature are moreover
informative in assessing the role played by guilt aversion as a motivation for behaviour
in our experiment.
Belief elicitation took place after the conclusion of the dictator game stage, but
before roles and payoffs were assigned. Table 1.2 reproduces what subjects saw on
their screen. Subjects were first asked how likely they thought it was that their
counterpart (i) succeeded in the matrix task, and (ii) chose the generous allocation
(conditional on having succeeded). Subsequently and on a separate screen, we
elicited subjects’ second-order beliefs by asking them to second-guess the responses
of their counterpart to the aforementioned questions. Subjects were paid a flat
payment of £1 for providing their initial responses. We decided not to incentivise the
accuracy of these responses because the conventional approach would have required
us to reveal information on a counterpart’s true behaviour (which our PD conditions
were specifically designed to avoid). This constraint did not apply to the elicitation
of second-order beliefs which were formed upon a counterpart’s beliefs rather than his
or her actions. Consequently, we incentivised the accuracy of subjects’ second-order
beliefs by awarding a bonus of £1 for every response that was correctly matched.
Table 1.2: Belief Elicitation
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Now, assume your counterpart correctly solved 15 matrices on time and made
a choice between Options A and B. How likely do you think it is that your
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We opted for a one-shot version of the game because we presumed that learning
associated with repeated play would eventually reduce or even erase the scope for
self-deception to be operative. To assist subjects in their understanding of the rules
and processes of the experiment, we initiated a practice phase in which they were
guided through the stages of the experiment, supplemented with detailed on-screen
explanations. In the course of this practice phase, subjects were also able to work on
scaled-down versions of the matrix task with computer simulated counterparts. A
late cut-off round (60s) familiarised them with how the matrix task worked, followed
by an early cut-off round (12s) which was meant to familiarise subjects with the
cut-off mechanism and its consequences.11 The practice phase concluded with a quiz
to ensure that subjects understood the instructions and processes of the experiment.
1.3.2 Hypotheses
We start this section by stating a set of more general hypotheses about the contents
and effects of exchanged messages before turning our attention to image motivation
in particular.
Hyp. 1: Subjects will use the communication stage to exchange promises.
Since the focus of our paper is on promise keeping, it was our intention to induce
high rates of promise exchange in our experiment. Although some subjects may
want to avoid commitment12, we expected promise induced cooperation on the
other-regarding allocation to be appealing to many subjects due to its equal and
total-earnings maximising payoff property. Moreover, our restrictive communication
protocol with pre-formulated messages made promise exchange suggestive and erased
any ambiguities surrounding the classification of messages often observed under
protocols of free form communication.
Hyp. 2: Generosity is higher in treatments featuring communication.
It is a well-documented finding in the literature that promises are often kept,
even in one-shot encounters and in the absence of punishment threats. According to
the commitment-based explanation of promise keeping, people keep their promises
because they have an intrinsic preference for keeping their word. Consequently, we
would expect some promise keeping to occur (and thereby increase generosity) under
11To make it more apparent to subjects that a cut-off could be desirable, we programmed
the computer to pick the opportunistic outcome in the early cut-off round. Thus, every subject
experienced at least once that a cut-off could result in the implementation of the opportunistic
outcome on the subject’s behalf.
12Think of subjects who prefer keeping promises but expect their counterpart to make
opportunistic promises which are bound to be broken. It is then rational for a subject not to
engage in mutual promise exchange.
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both our No Deniability and Plausible Deniability conditions.
Hyp. 3: Beliefs about generosity are higher in treatments featuring communication.
Hypothesis 3 naturally follows from hypothesis 2 under the assumption that
subjects believe the underlying theory. It is the process by which promises feed
expectations which also underlies the expectations-based explanation of promise
keeping based on guilt and according to which people dislike letting others down
on their promise-induced expectations.
We next turn our attention to understudied explanations of promise keeping
which rest on the relevance of social- and self-image concerns. We contribute to
the literature by assessing the empirical relevance of these explanations in our
experiment.
1.3.2.1 Social-Image Concerns
From the stream of research discussed in Section 1.2.2, we know that subjects care
about how they and their actions are being perceived by others. The assumption is
that being perceived in a negative light by others imposes a psychological cost on the
subject. Recall that the cut-off mechanism in our Plausible Deniability conditions
could serve as an excuse for selfish outcomes. Since a subject’s counterpart cannot
ascertain how an outcome came about, we would expect social-image concerns to be
mitigated in these treatments. Conversely, subjects in the No Deniability conditions
cannot use early cut-offs as excuses for selfish outcomes. Therefore, we would expect
social-image concerns to be amplified in these treatments.
The image concern that we are interested in arises over promise keeping. To
rule out an alternative image concern, namely that of being perceived as selfish (or,
greedy, unfair), we also conducted treatments where communication opportunities
were removed. Our identification strategy is to compare the relative effectiveness
of adding communication within our No Deniability as compared to our Plausible
Deniability conditions.13 Under the assumption that there exist subjects who suffer
an image cost of being perceived as a promise breaker by others, we would expect
communication to be more effective under No Deniability compared to Plausible
Deniability.
Hyp. 4: Communication increases generosity more strongly under ND than PD.
Again, given that subjects believe the underlying theory behind hypothesis 4,
they will anticipate social image concerns to be amplified in others under ND
compared to PD. We can state the following hypothesis:
13A similar strategy was applied by Schütte and Thoma (2014) in the context of a trust game.
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Hyp. 5: Communication increases beliefs about generosity more strongly under ND
than PD.
1.3.2.2 Self-Image Concerns
Our last set of hypotheses derive from the literature on self-image concerns which
we discussed in Section 1.2.3. The message of this stream of research is that
people desire to perceive the self in a favourable light. Psychological discomfort
can be experienced when behaviour threatens a person’s self-concept. One way of
maintaining a desired self-concept in light of opportunistic temptation is to engage
in self-deception.
Our idea is that self-image concerns may be relevant for promise-keeping. As a
consequence, the strength of promises may be diluted in environments which allow
people to self-deceive about the existence of a broken promise. In our experiment,
a subject who feels compelled to live up to her promise in order not to threaten her
self-image may want to procrastinate in the matrix task in the hope of being cut off
by the computer. A cut-off results in a fair chance of obtaining the opportunistic
outcome whilst allowing to maintain the perception of not having acted against one’s
promise. Recall that we conducted a control treatment where no counterpart was
involved and successful completion of the matrix task allowed the dictator to choose
her own payoff only. The assumption behind this treatment was that image related
incentives for procrastination would be removed, thereby allowing us to obtain an
unbiased approximation of subjects’ ability in the matrix task against which to
compare performances in our Plausible Deniability treatments (where we assumed
such incentives to be present).
As argued before, image concerns can relate to outcomes (perceiving the self
as selfish) and/or the process by which outcomes are reached (perceiving the self
as a promise breaker). Considering our No Communication conditions first where
only the former concern was at stake, we would expect self-deceivers in treatment
NC_PD to have worked significantly more slowly and/or to have committed more
mistakes compared to subjects in our control treatment.
Hyp. 6: Matrix task performance is worse under NC_PD than CONTROL.
In treatment C_PD, we assume that the additional self-image concern stemming
from promise making induces higher generosity. This provides yet more subjects
with an incentive to self-deceive and to procrastinate in the matrix task. From this,
we predict matrix task performance in treatment C_PD to be worse compared to
treatments NC_PD (and CONTROL).
Hyp. 7: Matrix task performance is worse under C_PD than NC_PD.
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Recall that beliefs about generosity are expected to be higher in conditions
featuring a communication stage. If anything, guilt aversion would therefore predict
more instead of less effort in the matrix task which would bias our results against
hypothesis 7.
1.3.3 Procedures
The experiment was programmed in z-Tree (Fischbacher, 2007) and conducted in
the Laboratory for Economic and Decision Research (LEDR) at the University of
East Anglia. A total of 254 participants recruited from the local student population
took part in the study. We ran 16 sessions in March 2018, each of which lasting
between 35-45 minutes, depending on the treatment. We ran more PD sessions to
compensate for the small data loss expected to occur by early cut-offs. The number
of sessions per treatment were: 3 x NC_ND, 3 x C_ND, 4 x NC_PD, 4 x C_PD, 2
x CONTROL. 16 subjects took part in each session, except for one NC_PD session
where only 14 subjects turned up. Average earnings were £10, with a minimum
earning of £4 and a maximum earning of £16 (including a £3 participation fee).
Upon arrival, participants were randomly assigned to computer terminals by
drawing their desk number. Each computer was located in a separate cubicle which
inhibited visual interaction or communication. Anonymity amongst participants
was secured because at no point during or after the experiment did any participant
receive identifying information about his or her peers. We also took great care
in the instructions emphasising that the experimenter would not be able to link
the generated data to any participant as a person. Participants received a hard
copy of the instructions and were asked to follow along as the experimenter read
the instructions out aloud. Clarifications were provided on an individual basis.
Participants were asked to answer a set of five control questions after the completion
of the practice phase to ensure that they understood the instructions and processes of
the experiment. Two further control questions were displayed after details regarding
the cut-off mechanism were publicly announced by the experimenter. The experiment
concluded with a brief questionnaire asking for socio-demographic characteristics.
Privacy was ensured during the payment phase by asking participants to individually
collect their final earnings from an assistant at the end of the experiment.
1.4 Results
Section 1.4.1 looks at the communication contents of our experiment. Section 1.4.2
analyses the effects of communication, focusing on social-image effects in Section
1.4.2.1 and self-image effects in Section 1.4.2.2.
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1.4.1 Communication Contents
Table 1.3 summarises the observed message profiles (pairs of messages) broken down
by treatment condition. Recall that by design, our deniability manipulations took
place only after the communication stage concluded. Up to that point, the protocol
of the experiment and the instructions were identical. We would therefore expect
no significant differences in the contents of exchanged messages across treatments.
This is confirmed by our data which is why we henceforth refer to the pooled data
provided in the last column of Table 1.3.
By looking at the first two rows of Table 1.3, we can see that 46 out of 56
first-movers (82.1%) sent the cooperative message 1 stating a promise intent. Among
the 46 second-movers who received a promise intent, 42 (91.3%) reciprocated with
a promise thereby establishing mutual promise exchange. Unsurprisingly, amongst
the few cases (10 out of 56) where first-movers refrained from proposing a mutual
exchange of promises by stating that they do not want to commit themselves, the
majority of second-movers (8 out of 10) decided not to commit either. Two subjects
decided to commit despite not having received an intention to commit by their
counterpart. In line with hypothesis 1, we can state the following result:
Result 1. Most pairs of subjects (75%) used communication to exchange promises.










































a The Z-statistic reflects two-tailed tests of differences in proportions.
1.4.2 Communication Effects
Having established that subjects used the communication stage to exchange promises,
we can investigate whether and by what means promise exchange increased generosity
in our communication treatments.
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Our analysis is based on subjects who successfully completed the matrix task
and for which choice data in the dictator game is available. Losing data on subjects
who were cut off before the completion of the task may raise self-selection concerns.
As discussed before, we designed our experiment to minimise these concerns. As
expected, the proportions of subjects who were cut off in our Plausible Deniability
conditions were small: 6/64 (9.4%) in treatment C_PD, 9/62 (14.5%) in treatment
NC_PD, and 4/32 (12.5%) in treatment CONTROL. Moreover, if selection issues
were present in the sense that procrastinators successfully managed to enforce a
cut-off, we would expect the proportion of cut-offs to be higher in treatments
C_PD and NC_PD (where incentives for procrastination were present) compared
to treatment CONTROL (where incentives for procrastination were removed). This
however was not the case according to pairwise Fisher’s exact tests (p = 0.441 and
p = 0.529 respectively, one-tailed). Appendix 1.A.1 provides details on cut-off times
and matrix task progress of subjects who were cut off before they reached the target.
It is noteworthy that a considerable proportion of these subjects (11/21 or 52.4%)
did not manage to solve a single matrix in the practice stage, suggesting that our
cut-off mechanism filtered out subjects who lacked a sufficient understanding of the
task.
1.4.2.1 Social-Image Effects
All data referred to in this section is also subsumed in Table 1.4 which provides
detailed summary statistics on the frequency of cut-offs, on choices in the dictator
game stage, and on reported beliefs, all broken down by treatment and, if applicable,
by communication history. Unless otherwise stated, reported Z statistics reflect tests
of proportions (see Glasnapp and Poggio, 1985) when comparing choice data in the
dictator game and Wilcoxon rank sum tests (see Siegel and Castellan, 1988) when
comparing reported belief data.
Figure 1.3 summarises our main findings by depicting the proportions of subjects
choosing the generous allocation for each treatment separately. Our communication
protocol is effective in increasing generous allocations both under conditions of No
Deniability (20.8% vs. 58.7%; Z = -3.756, p < 0.01, one-tailed) as well as under
conditions of Plausible Deniability (18.9% vs. 37.9%; Z = -2.215, p = 0.013,
one-tailed). A strong effect of communication is in line with hypothesis 2 and
research discussed in Section 1.2.1. We state the following result:
Result 2. Generosity is higher in treatments featuring communication.
It is evident from our data however that communication has a stronger effect on
generosity under ND compared to PD which squares well with hypothesis 4 and the








































Communication 112 8(7.1%) 49(47.1%) 55(52.9%) 4.44 4.46 2.88 2.88
C_ND 48 2(4.2%) 27(58.7%) 19(41.3%) 4.80 4.87 2.98 2.93
C_ND_PromiseEx. 34 1(2.9%) 25(75.8%) 8(24.2%) 4.79 4.85 3.24 3.21
C_ND_NoPromiseEx. 14 1(7.1%) 2(15.4%) 11(84.6%) 4.85 4.92 2.31 2.23
C_PD 64 6(9.4%) 22(37.9%) 36(62.1%) 4.16 4.14 2.81 2.84
C_PD_PromiseEx. 50 5(10.0%) 22(48.9%) 23(51.1%) 4.18 4.18 3.22 3.20
C_PD_NoPromiseEx. 14 1(7.1%) 0(0.0%) 13(100%) 4.08 4.00 1.38 1.62
No Communication 110 9(8.2%) 20(19.8%) 81(80.2%) 4.50 4.47 2.26 2.23
NC_ND 48 0(0.0%) 10(20.8%) 38(79.2%) 4.88 4.83 2.33 2.31
NC_PD 62 9(14.5%) 10(18.9%) 43(81.1%) 4.17 4.13 2.19 2.15
CONTROL 32 4(12.5%) 1(3.6%) 27(96.4%) n/a n/a n/a n/a
Note: Question 1 asked: “How likely do you think it is that your counterpart solved 15 matrices on time?”. Question 2 asked: “Now, assume that your counterpart solved 15
matrices on time and made a choice between Options A and B. How likely do you think it is that your counterpart chose Option B(£6,£6)?”. Answers were submitted on a 5 point
Likert scale ranging from 1 (=“very unlikely”) to 5 (=“very likely”). A subject’s first-order belief (FO_Belief) is his or her response to these questions. A subject’s second-order
belief (SO_Belief) is his or her guess regarding the response to these questions provided by their counterpart. Reported are the mean responses for each respective question.
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Result 3. Communication increases generosity more strongly under ND than PD.
As illustrated in Figure 1.3, our deniability manipulation affected generosity
within our Communication conditions only, not however within conditions where no
communication was possible. Looking at our Communication conditions first, we
observe that plausible deniability significantly decreased the proportion of subjects
choosing the generous allocation from 58.7% to 37.9% (Z = 2.107, p = 0.018,
one-tailed). Considering promise keeping proportions in particular as shown in
Table 1.4, we observe a significant decline from 75.8% in treatment C_ND to
48.9% in treatment C_PD (Z = 2.396, p < 0.01, one-tailed). Inspecting our No
Communication conditions next reveals that plausible deniability decreased the
proportion of generous allocations by merely two percentage points. Although the
effect goes in the anticipated direction, the difference is insignificant (Z = 0.248, p
= 0.402, one-tailed). It appears that subjects in the No Communication treatments
were not particularly concerned about the transparency of their decisions. Or, put
differently, purely outcome based image concerns (such as being perceived as selfish,
egoistic, or unfair) seem not to have played a major role in our experiment. On
the contrary, our results are compatible with the existence of a social image concern
particular to promise keeping per se.
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Do subjects predict the effects of our treatment variables on their counterpart’s
behaviour? We collected data on subjects’ beliefs about their counterpart to answer
this question. Responses were submitted on a 5 point Likert scale ranging from 1
(=“very unlikely”) to 5 (=“very likely”). As illustrated earlier in Table 1.2, we first
asked subjects how likely they thought it was that their counterpart succeeded in
the matrix task. The purpose of asking this first question was to check whether
our deniability manipulations were successful in diffusing a counterpart’s perceived
responsibility for outcomes. As is evident from the data provided in Table 1.4,
this was indeed the case. Plausible deniability decreased average first-order beliefs
relating to question 1 within both our Communication (4.80 vs. 4.16; Z = 4.623,
p < 0.01, one-tailed) and No Communication (4.88 vs. 4.17; Z = 4.808, p < 0.01,
one-tailed) conditions. The same pattern holds for second-order beliefs. Allowing
subjects to communicate, on the other hand, had no impact on a subject’s belief
about their counterpart’s success in the matrix task.
Looking at first-order responses to question 2, we can see that communication
and the exchange of promises raised subjects’ own beliefs about a counterpart’s
generosity (2.26 vs. 2.88; Z = -3.488, p < 0.01, one-tailed). On top of that,
communication was correctly predicted by subjects to also move their counterparts’
beliefs about the subjects’ own generosity as evidenced by subjects’ second-order
beliefs (2.23 vs. 2.88; Z = -3.592, p < 0.01, one-tailed). In line with hypothesis 3,
we state the following result:
Result 4. Beliefs about generosity are higher in our communication treatments.
This suggests that subjects anticipated an effect of promise exchange on generosity.
Comparing subjects’ first-order responses to question 2 between our deniability
conditions allows us to investigate whether subjects anticipated their counterpart
to exploit the diffusion of responsibility inherent in our PD conditions. Relatedly,
subjects’ second-order responses are informative as to whether subjects anticipated
their counterpart to anticipate such an effect to be present. In light of the fact that
we did find an effect of deniability on behaviour as stated in result 3, it is surprising
that subjects appear not to have anticipated deniability to matter to others. In
the case of subjects’ first-order beliefs (and equivalently so for second-order beliefs),
we observe no statistical differences between our deniability conditions. This result
holds both within our No Communication conditions (2.33 vs. 2.19; Z = 0.762, p
= 0.446, two-tailed) and within our Communication conditions (2.98 vs. 2.81; Z =
0.607, p = 0.544, two-tailed).
Result 5. The effect of communication on beliefs does not differ under ND and
PD. This suggests that subjects failed to anticipate promise keeping to be sensitive
to our deniability manipulations.
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It is interesting to see that guilt aversion – whilst providing a possible explanation
(through result 4) for some of the generosity we observe – does not seem to capture
the differences that we observe between our deniability manipulations. We observe
higher generosity in treatment C_ND than C_PD despite there being no significant
differences in subjects’ reported beliefs about generous behaviour between these
treatments. Appendix 1.A.2 reproduces the results obtained in this section using
regression analysis.
1.4.2.2 Self-Image Effects
Recall that despite being able to exploit deniability in treatment C_PD, a significant
proportion of subjects (22/45 or 48.9%) honoured their promise. Conventional
theories of promise keeping would argue that this effect is due to either an intrinsic
preference for promise keeping (Vanberg, 2008), or an aversion to letting promisees
down on their payoff expectations (Charness and Dufwenberg, 2006). Even social
image concerns could still be present under the assumption that our PD treatments
mitigated instead of fully erased perceived responsibility. An alternative explanation
which has yet received little attention in the literature on promise keeping is that
subjects honour their word to maintain their self-image as an honest person.
If self-image concerns contribute to the effectiveness of promises, we would
expect its effect to be mitigated in environments which allow subjects to self-deceive
about the cause of a broken promise. We hypothesised that self-deception in our
experiment would take the form of subjects procrastinating in the matrix task to
delegate their choice to the computer.
To obtain a benchmark for subjects’ abilities in the matrix task against which
to compare performances in our plausible deniability treatments, we conducted our
control treatment which erased incentives for procrastination. The following analysis
is based on a comparison of performances in the matrix task observed between
treatments C_PD, NC_PD, and CONTROL.








NC_PD 62 9(14.5%) 102s/102s 1.49/1
C_PD 64 6(9.4%) 103s/100s 1.22/1
CONTROL 32 4(12.5%) 111s/104s 1.29/1
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Table 1.5 reports summary statistics on the speed and accuracy with which
subjects solved the target amount of 15 matrices.14 Figure 1.4 provides the associated
cumulative distribution functions of success times across treatments. If subjects
procrastinated in our main treatments, we would expect the respective CDF’s to
lie further to the right compared to our control treatment where incentives for
procrastination were removed. We observe the opposite. It appears that subjects
in our main treatments performed even better than subjects in the control which
is particularly pronounced at the segment of high performing subjects. However,
according to pairwise Kolmogorov-Smirnoff tests, the distributions of treatments
C_PD and NC_PD do not differ significantly from CONTROL (p = 0.157 and
0.227, respectively).
We also looked at within-subject variation of performances in the matrix task.
It is possible that procrastination would take the form of subjects slowing down
on the task the closer they approach the target amount of 15 matrices. Figure 1.5
depicts for every treatment separately the average time spent on each of the 15
14We continue to condition our analysis on the sample of subjects who have not been cut off.
Recall our previous discussion on p. 17 and Appendix 1.A.1 for a justification of this approach.
An advantage of doing so is that our cut-off mechanism simultaneously sorted out subjects who
lacked sufficient understanding of the task. To keep these subjects in our sample would have made
it complicated to discern motivated procrastination from delay due to misunderstanding.
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tasks. Again, eye-balling the results suggests that subjects in our main treatments
performed better than subjects in the control treatment.
We ran a random effects panel model estimation to quantify what is observed
in Figure 1.5. Results are presented in Table 1.6. Our dependent variable is the
natural logarithm of the time (in seconds) taken by a subject to solve a given task.
TREAT is a dummy distinguishing our treatment conditions with CONTROL being
the reference category. TASK_N is the task number allowing us to measure changes
in performance over time. We also include an interaction term between TREAT and
TASK_N to allow performance changes to be treatment specific. The coefficient
for TASK_N is positive and significant suggesting that subjects in our control
treatment exhibit performance reductions as they move through the tasks. Such an
effect could be due to boredom, or fatigue. On the contrary, no time trend is observed
in treatments NC_PD and C_PD. This is evident from the negative coefficients of
our interaction terms which are significant and fully compensate the negative time
trend observed in our control treatment. Overall, performance in the matrix task
appears to be worse in our control treatment with there being no difference between
treatments C_PD and NC_PD. This result contradicts hypotheses 6 and 7 and lets
us conclude with:
Result 6. We find no evidence of procrastination in treatments NC_PD and C_PD.
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NC_PD -0.015 0.050 -0.30 0.762
C_PD 0.023 0.050 0.47 0.641
TASK_N 0.012 0.004 3.15 0.002
TREAT × TASK_N
NC_PD -0.010 0.005 -2.23 0.026
C_PD -0.012 0.004 -2.82 0.005
_CONS 1.847 0.041 45.31 0.000
Prob > chi2 0.013
R-Squared 0.015
Number of Groups 139
Number of Observations 2085
a Standard errors are clustered on the subject level.
1.5 Discussion
Similar to previous studies looking at the role of non-binding verbal commitments on
cooperative behaviour, we observe a positive relationship. It is noteworthy that the
effects that we observe originate from a rather reserved protocol of pre-formulated
message exchange which is commonly perceived to be less powerful than free-form
communication (see e.g. Charness and Dufwenberg, 2010). We ascribe this result
to the nature of our experimental protocol. Since we generate promise exchange in
a dictator instead of a trust game framework, our environment is less susceptible
to reciprocity effects which usually generate significant rates of trustworthiness in
baseline conditions and thereby limit the scope for treatment effects to be detectable.
The idea for this design feature goes back to Vanberg (2008)’s random dictatorship
game. Our results suggest that this protocol may be of interest to researchers who
prefer to resort to pre-formulated message exchange without making compromises
on the effectiveness of promises, or those who are concerned about “ceiling effects”
in trust game studies.
A separate examination of the effect of communication under No Deniability as
compared to Plausible Deniability revealed that promise keeping was sensitive to
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whether a promisee could undoubtedly blame the promisor for outcomes. Note that
the observed effect cannot be attributed to an intrinsic preference which underlies
the commitment-based explanation of promise keeping. This theory predicts promise
keeping to be independent of image concerns. Our analysis was moreover able to rule
out alternative explanations such as an image concern of being perceived as selfish,
or an aversion to guilt. We also judge it unlikely that our results were driven by
experimenter observability or demand because (i) the presence of the experimenter
was not altered between treatments, and (ii) our treatment manipulations required
only subtle changes to the experimental protocol. Instead, our results square well
with the hypothesis that promise keeping is partly driven by subjects’ aversion to
being perceived as a promise breaker by their counterpart.
An interesting finding is the observation that subjects do not appear to have
anticipated their counterpart to be sensitive to our deniability manipulations. This is
surprising, given that subjects themselves did respond to the increased transparency
embedded in our ND conditions by keeping their promises more often. It is possible
that the emotion of shame, whilst being an important factor of a subject’s own
decision making process, is underestimated to play as important a role in others’
behaviour. Under this premise, de-biasing subjects seems to be a promising avenue
to foster the successful initiation of relationships based on trust.
Albeit to a lesser extent, promises remained to be effective even within our PD
conditions. Both the commitment-based and the expectations-based explanations
of promise keeping provide potential candidates for explaining this finding and our
experiment was not designed to discern the empirical relevance of these theories from
one another. Instead, we focused on a plausible alternative explanation of promise
keeping which stems from the idea that subjects keep their promises in order not
to threaten their self-image. This theory gave rise to the hypothesis that subjects
would engage in self-deception – which would take the form of procrastination in
the matrix task – to hide a reluctance to keep promises. We tested this hypothesis
and report a null result.
One way of interpreting our null result is to take it as corroborating evidence
of the strength of promises: subjects did not self-deceive because they truly desired
to live up to their promise. At the same time, our result may call into question
the generalisability of evidence supporting self-deception in dictator game studies to
morally richer environments, as similarly pointed out by Van der Weele et al. (2014,
p. 262). The authors implement a cut-off mechanism to investigate the robustness
of reciprocal behaviour and likewise report a null result. There are caveats in order
here, however.
Firstly, Regner (2018) reports a positive result observing that subjects do use
the cut-off mechanism to avoid reciprocating others’s kindness under different payoff
calibrations of the trust game. He points out that the lack of a treatment effect in
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Van der Weele et al. (2014) could be attributed to a ceiling effect stemming from
the high proportion of selfish decisions (62.5%) observed in their baseline. Whilst
a ceiling effect could have also been at work in our No Communication treatments,
it is less likely that the same applied to our Communication treatments where the
proportion of selfish allocations in our ND baseline was merely 41.3%.
Lastly, it is important to point out differences in the way we designed our
experiment as compared to the aforementioned studies and in particular compared
to the seminal paper by Dana, Weber and Kuang (2007). Whereas in their study,
self-deception required subjects to deliberately wait for the computer to intervene, in
our study subjects could delegate their decision in a more subtle and inconspicuous
way by means of procrastination in an active task. One could argue that our design
is less susceptible to demand effects and therefore provides a more natural testing
ground for self-deception. At the same time, our experiment is more complex. It
is possible that the additional complexity of our experiment made it more difficult
for subjects to fully process the “exploitability” of our cut-off mechanism. However,
as discussed in the design section of our experiment, we initiated a practice phase
to assist subjects’ general understanding of our game. In the course of this practice
phase, we also exposed subjects to outcomes which hinted at the possible desirability
of being cut off in our experiment.
1.6 Conclusion
Trust is often referred to as the glue to social capital formation. Although its
efficiency enhancing nature is desirable, trust can also be betrayed. Communication
and the exchange of promises are among the most prominent mechanisms to promote
trust.
The experiment that we presented was specifically set out to assess the relevance
of two understudied explanations of promise keeping, namely social- and self-image
concerns. We observe evidence of social-image concerns in treatments which feature
ex-ante opportunities for promise exchange. Ruling out alternative explanations,
our results are consistent with subject exhibiting an aversion to being perceived as a
promise breaker by others. Surprisingly, subjects seem not to anticipate social-image
concerns to be present in others. Our test of self-image concerns yielded a null
result: there is no evidence of subjects engaging in self-deception to evade their
promise-induced commitments. This resilience could be interpreted as corroborating
evidence of the strength of promises.
Our study contributes to the literature on promise keeping by documenting the
significance of social-image concerns and, to the best of our knowledge, by being the
first to have tested for self-image concerns.
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Appendix for Chapter 1
1.A Supplementary Data
1.A.1 Cut-offs and Task Performance
Table A.1 lists subjects who were cut-off from the task before successfully solving
the required number of 15 matrices. Overall, this was the case for 21 out of 254
(8.3%) subjects in our experiment. In the last column, we indicate whether or not a
respective subject correctly solved any of the matrices of the practice phase of our
experiment. This information may be informative as to whether or not a subject
struggled understanding the task. For some subjects, this appears to have indeed
been the case as is evident e.g. from subject #249 who made 96 mistakes in the
control treatment. Another subject directly expressed to the experimenter confusion
about how to solve a given matrix in the practice stage.
It appears that many of the cut-offs observed are consistent with delays due
to misunderstanding rather than procrastination. Examining the reported cut-off
times and the progress of subjects who demonstrated understanding of the task, it
does not appear to be the case that cut off subjects were reluctant to solve the task.







1. NC_PD 52 9 176 12 4 No.
2. NC_PD 57 9 23 3 0 Yes.
3. NC_PD 60 9 193 0 6 No.
4. NC_PD 61 9 25 5 0 Yes.
5. NC_PD 72 10 35 3 1 No.
6. NC_PD 73 10 65 9 0 Yes.
7. NC_PD 101 12 38 1 4 No.
8. NC_PD 103 12 113 12 2 Yes.
9. NC_PD 104 12 22 3 0 Yes.
10. C_ND 115 5 300 0 14 No.
11. C_ND 152 7 300 0 7 No.
12. C_PD 179 2 83 9 1 Yes.
13. C_PD 182 2 78 10 0 Yes.
14. C_PD 191 3 86 12 0 Yes.
15. C_PD 195 3 41 5 0 Yes.
16. C_PD 206 3 100 12 3 No.
17. C_PD 220 4 165 6 8 No.
18. CONTROL 225 8 175 13 3 No.
19. CONTROL 242 16 66 4 2 No.
20. CONTROL 246 16 106 14 1 Yes.
21. CONTROL 249 16 171 2 96 No.
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1.A.2 Regression Results
In Table A.2 we report supplementary regression results supporting the conclusions
derived from our non-parametric analyses reported in the main text. The dependent
variable in models [1]-[2] is a dummy taking value 1 if the generous allocation was
chosen, and 0 otherwise. In models [3]-[6], the dependent variable is the respective
question 2 belief measured on a 5 point Likert scale. As independent variables we
include dummies for our treatment conditions and the interaction thereof. What we
find is that communication exerts a strong influence on generosity and on reported
beliefs which is consistent with the idea that an effect of communication could partly
be mediated through guilt aversion. The negative interaction term in models [1]-[2]
moreover suggests that communication exerts a stronger effect on generosity within
our No Deniability conditions. Interestingly and in line with our previous findings,
this asymmetry is not mirrored by beliefs which is evident from the insignificant
interaction term reported in models [3]-[6].
The result that communication and promise exchange affect behaviour more
strongly under No Deniability, coupled with the finding that beliefs were not affected,
suggests that the effect of our deniability manipulations is unlikely to be attributed
to an aversion to guilt. Instead, our findings are consistent with subjects exhibiting
an aversion to being perceived as a promise breaker by others.
Table A.2: Regression Results
[1] [2] [3] [4] [5] [6]
Model: Probit OLS Ord. Logit OLS Ord. Logit OLS





















































0.084 0.108 0.022 0.074 0.022 0.075
n 205 205 205 205 205 205
Note: All regressions cluster observations on the session level. Robust standard errors are reported in
parentheses. *(**, ***): coefficient significantly different from zero at the 10% (5%, 1%) level.
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1.B Instructions and Screens
1.B.1 Main Treatment Instructions
Information in brackets [. . . ] only applies to treatments featuring a communication
stage. Otherwise, instructions are identical across our four main treatments. Subjects
received information regarding the cut-off mechanism just before entering the matrix
solving stage.
Instructions
Welcome to this experiment and thank you for participating. Please follow along
carefully as the experimenter reads the instructions out aloud. The purpose of this
experiment is to study how people make decisions in particular situations. You were
awarded £3 for showing up on time. Your additional earnings in this experiment
depend on the decisions you and other participants make during the experiment
and on chance. At the end of the experiment, the entire amount will be paid to you
individually and privately in cash by an assistant.
Please do not speak to other participants during the experiment and keep your
phones switched off. If you have any questions at any time over the course of the
experiment, please raise your hand and an experimenter will come to assist you.
Note that your behaviour in this experiment is recorded by the computer and stored
in a database. The records of this database are anonymous, i.e. not traceable to
you as a person. For accounting reasons only, you will be asked to fill in and sign a
receipt of your earnings at the end of the experiment. To secure anonymity, these
receipts will be kept entirely separate from any data on your behaviour generated
in the experiment.
Please remain seated until you are individually asked by the experimenter to collect
your final earnings at the end of the experiment.
The Experiment
At the beginning of the experiment, you will be paired with another randomly deter-
mined participant in the room who will from now on be called your counterpart.
No participant will get to know the identity of his/her counterpart during or after
the experiment.
All participants in this experiment are provided with the same set of instructions
and will encounter the same stages as described below:
Stage 1: Matrix Task.
In stage 1 of the experiment, you will work on a matrix solving task. The task
consists of counting ones (1s) in a series of matrices comprised of random 0s and
1s. A sample matrix is depicted in Figure 1 below.
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Figure 1: Sample Matrix
0 1 1 1 0
0 0 0 0 0
1 0 0 1 1
1 1 1 1 0
1 1 0 1 0
You will be able to work on this task for a maximum of 300 seconds (5 minutes).
Importantly, you will be timed-out by the computer at some point during this time
interval. If this happens, the matrix task will end. You will then be asked to work
on a follow-up task for the remainder of the 300 seconds.
All participants will be provided with additional details regarding the time-out
mechanism in the later course of the experiment.
Outcomes in the matrix task (not however in the follow-up task) have direct conse-
quences for the decision environment in stage 2 of the experiment:
• If you correctly solve at least 15 matrices before you are timed-out by the
computer, you will be able make a decision in stage 2 of the experiment.
• If you do not correctly solve at least 15 matrices before you are timed-out
by the computer, you will not be able to make a decision in stage 2 of the
experiment.
After the conclusion of the matrix and follow-up task (i.e. after 300 seconds), you
will move forward to stage 2 of the experiment.
Stage 2: Decision Stage.
In stage 2 of the experiment, you will potentially be able to choose between two
options. Your choice indicates how you would like to allocate money between you
and your counterpart. The possible options are:
• Option A: £10 to you and £0 to your counterpart.
• Option B: £6 to you and £6 to your counterpart.
If you succeeded in solving at least 15 matrices in stage 1 of the experiment, you
yourself will choose between Option A and Option B.
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If you did not succeed in solving at least 15 matrices in stage 1 of the experiment,
the computer instead will randomly choose between Option A and Option B with
equal probability.
The resulting option (A or B) will be called your individual stage 2 outcome.
You will know whether the outcome of your stage 2 was determined by your own
choice or by the choice of the computer. Your counterpart, however, will not know
how your stage 2 outcome came about.
Determining the Relevant Player.
After both you and your counterpart have individually completed the stages above,
one of you will be randomly determined by the computer to become the Relevant
Player.
If you become the Relevant Player, your stage 2 outcome will be implemented. If you
do not become the Relevant Player, your stage 2 outcome will not be implemented
and will therefore have no consequences for payoffs in the experiment. In this case,
your payoffs will solely be determined by the stage 2 outcome of your counterpart
because he or she was assigned the role of Relevant Player.
Note that it is equally likely that you or your counterpart will be assigned the role
of Relevant Player.
[Communication Phase.
Before stage 1 of the experiment starts you will be asked to choose one of two
pre-defined messages to be sent to your counterpart.
Note that at this point, you will not know which of you will become the Relevant
Player in the experiment. You will receive this information only at the end of the
experiment.
Messages will be exchanged sequentially. One participant will be randomly deter-
mined to send the first message by choosing one of the following options:
Message 1: “I promise to do my best to implement Option B, if you promise to do
the same.”
Message 2: “I don’t want to commit myself to anything.”
The second participant in a group will then be asked to reply by choosing one of
the following options:
Message 1: “I promise to do my best to implement Option B.”
Message 2: “I don’t want to commit myself to anything.”
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Importantly, the sequence in which messages are exchanged is randomly determined
and not related to the assignment of roles at the end of the experiment. Again, this
means that at the time when you exchange messages with your counterpart, you will
not know which of you will be assigned the role of Relevant Player.]
Bonus: Guessing.
At certain points during the experiment, you will have the opportunity to earn small
amounts of additional money by guessing decisions and outcomes in the experiment.
You will learn more about this during the experiment.
Practice.
We will now briefly guide you through the decision stages in order for you to get a
better understanding of the interface and processes of this experiment. You will also
be able to familiarise yourself with the matrix task. We will conclude the practice
phase with a quiz to check your understanding.
Please follow along on screen.
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Communication Screen (cont.)
Matrix Task Intro Screen – Round 1
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Matrix Task Screen – Round 1 (Late Cut-off)
Success Screen – Round 1
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Relevant Player Screen – Round 1
Outcome Screen – Round 1
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Matrix Task Intro Screen – Round 2
Matrix Task Screen – Round 2 (Early Cut-off)
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Time-out Screen – Round 2
Filler Task Screen – Round 2
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No Success Screen – Round 2
Computer Randomisation Screen – Round 2
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Relevant Player Screen – Round 2
Outcome Screen – Round 2
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1.B.3 Control Questions
Upon completion of the practice stage, subjects were asked to answer a set of 5
control questions. 2 more control questions were assessed after details regarding the
cut-off mechanism were announced. Questions in the control treatment differed only
marginally which is why they are not explicitly reported here. Correct answers are
highlighted. Where correct answers differ, green marks the correct answer in the No
Deniability conditions and blue marks the correct answer in the Plausible Deniability
conditions.
Control Question 1:
The data generated in this experiment ...
X is anonymous, neither the experimenter nor other participants will be able to
link my behaviour to me as a person.
links my behaviour in the experiment to me as a person.
links my behaviour in the experiment to me as a person, but only the experi-
menter will be able to make this connection.
Control Question 2:
Participants in this experiment ...
are provided with different instructions but will encounter the same stages in
the experiment.
X are all provided with the same instructions and will encounter the same stages
in the experiment.
will encounter different stages in the experiment.
Control Question 3:
I will be able to choose between Option A and Option B ...
no matter what.
X only if I solve enough matrices on time.
only if I will be timed-out by the computer in the matrix task.
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Control Question 4:
My stage 2 outcome will contribute to my earnings in the experiment ...
no matter what.
X only if I become assigned the role of Relevant Player at the end of the experi-
ment.




will learn whether I succeeded in the matrix task.
will learn whether my stage 2 outcome was chosen by me or by the computer.
X will neither learn my performance in the matrix task nor whether my stage 2
outcome was chosen by me or by the computer.
Control Question 6:
In this experiment ...
X I will be timed out when the maximum allotted time of 300 seconds is reached.
X I can be timed out at any second within the maximum allotted time of 300
seconds.
I will never be timed out.
Control Question 7:
What will your counterpart know after you completed the matrix task?
My counterpart will know how many matrices I solved.
X My counterpart will know that I was able to work on the matrix task for 300
seconds.
X My counterpart will know that I was timed out anywhere within 300 seconds.
He will however not know when exactly my time out occurred.
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1.B.4 Control Treatment Instructions
In this treatment, we erased the recipient role. All other features of this treatment
including the instructions and experimental procedures closely followed treatment
NC_PD. We also implemented a counterpart to the role uncertainty feature in the
main treatments which meant that outcomes would only count in half of the cases.
In the control treatment, we let the computer pick a ‘relevant scenario’ instead of a
‘relevant player’. If a subject’s scenario was determined not to count, a compensation
of £3 was awarded which lies just in-between the two possible payoff allocations (£6
or £0) which a subject could have expected to be allocated in the main treatments by
her counterpart.
Instructions
Welcome to this experiment and thank you for participating. Please follow along
carefully as the experimenter reads the instructions out aloud. The purpose of this
experiment is to study how people make decisions in particular situations. You were
awarded £3 for showing up on time. Your additional earnings in this experiment
depend on the decisions you and other participants make during the experiment
and on chance. At the end of the experiment, the entire amount will be paid to you
individually and privately in cash by an assistant.
Please do not speak to other participants during the experiment and keep your
phones switched off. If you have any questions at any time over the course of the
experiment, please raise your hand and an experimenter will come to assist you.
Note that your behaviour in this experiment is recorded by the computer and stored
in a database. The records of this database are anonymous, i.e. not traceable to
you as a person. For accounting reasons only, you will be asked to fill in and sign a
receipt of your earnings at the end of the experiment. To secure anonymity, these
receipts will be kept entirely separate from any data on your behaviour generated
in the experiment.
Please remain seated until you are individually asked by the experimenter to collect
your final earnings at the end of the experiment.
The Experiment
All participants in this experiment are provided with the same set of instructions
and will encounter the same stages as described below:
Stage 1: Matrix Task.
In stage 1 of the experiment, you will work on a matrix solving task. The task
consists of counting ones (1s) in a series of matrices comprised of random 0s and
1s. A sample matrix is depicted in Figure 1 below.
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Figure 1: Sample Matrix
0 1 1 1 0
0 0 0 0 0
1 0 0 1 1
1 1 1 1 0
1 1 0 1 0
You will be able to work on this task for a maximum of 300 seconds (5 minutes).
Importantly, you will be timed-out by the computer at some point during this time
interval. If this happens, the matrix task will end. You will then be asked to work
on a follow-up task for the remainder of the 300 seconds.
All participants will be provided with additional details regarding the time-out
mechanism in the later course of the experiment.
Outcomes in the matrix task (not however in the follow-up task) have direct conse-
quences for the decision environment in stage 2 of the experiment:
• If you correctly solve at least 15 matrices before you are timed-out by the
computer, you will be able make a decision in stage 2 of the experiment.
• If you do not correctly solve at least 15 matrices before you are timed-out
by the computer, you will not be able to make a decision in stage 2 of the
experiment.
After the conclusion of the matrix and follow-up task (i.e. after 300 seconds), you
will move forward to stage 2 of the experiment.
Stage 2: Decision Stage.
In stage 2 of the experiment, you will potentially be able to choose between two
options. Your choice indicates how much money you would like to allocate to
yourself. The possible options are:
• Option A: £10 to you.
• Option B: £6 to you.
If you succeeded in solving at least 15 matrices in stage 1 of the experiment, you
yourself will choose between Option A and Option B.
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If you did not succeed in solving at least 15 matrices in stage 1 of the experiment,
the computer instead will randomly choose between Option A and Option B with
equal probability.
The resulting option (A or B) will be called your individual stage 2 outcome.
Determining the Relevant Scenario.
After you have completed the stages above, the computer will randomly determine
whether your stage 2 outcome becomes the Relevant Scenario.
If your stage 2 outcome becomes the Relevant Scenario, it will be implemented. If
your stage 2 outcome does not become the Relevant Scenario, your stage 2 outcome
will not be implemented and will therefore have no consequences for payoffs in the
experiment. In this case, you will instead earn a compensation of £3.
Note that it is equally likely that your stage 2 outcome will or will not become the
Relevant Scenario.
Practice.
We will now briefly guide you through the decision stages in order for you to get a
better understanding of the interface and processes of this experiment. You will also
be able to familiarise yourself with the matrix task. We will conclude the practice
phase with a quiz to check your understanding.
Please follow along on screen.
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1.B.5 Revelation of Cut-off Details
Just before subjects entered the matrix solving stage, we publicly announced treatment
specific details regarding the cut-off mechanism both verbally and on screen.
Script [1] for treatments NC_ND and C_ND:
Details regarding the time-out mechanism:
In this experiment, the time-out in the matrix task will occur at a fixed point
in time. You will be timed out when the maximum allotted time of 300 seconds (5
minutes) is reached. Note that you and your counterpart will be timed out at the
exact same time.
Script [2] for treatments NC_PD and C_PD:
Details regarding the time-out mechanism:
In this experiment, the time-out in the matrix task will occur at a randomly
determined point in time. Any second within the maximum allotted time of 300
seconds (5 minutes) is possible. Note that you will be timed out independently of
your counterpart.
Script [3] for treatment CONTROL:
Details regarding the time-out mechanism:
In this experiment, the time-out in the matrix task will occur at a randomly
determined point in time. Any second within the maximum allotted time of 300





†I would like to thank Robert Sugden, Anders Poulsen, and Odile Poulsen for financial support
and helpful guidance. I would also like to thank Amrish Patel for serving as a discussant at the
design stage of the experiment and Silvia Sondereggar for useful comments. Finally I would like
to thank the audience of the 2019 CCC (CBESS-CEDEX-CREED) meeting for their feedback.
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2.1 Introduction
In Leviathan (1651), one of the most influential expositions of Social Contract
Theory, Thomas Hobbes sees the delegation of human rights to an authority as
a requirement to tame opportunistic behaviour and to keep social interactions in
order. Without such an authority and its ability to enforce normative behaviour
through legal sanctions, humans would live in a state of anarchy characterised by a
“war of all against all”.
In modern societies, authorities play an important role in deterring misconduct
and criminal behaviours. On the streets, policemen intervene and defuse emerging
conflicts amongst citizens. In the courtroom, judges and juries evaluate disputes and
impose sanctions in an attempt to restore justice and to deter future misconduct.
Deterrence, however, is imperfect because low detection probabilities and mild
sanctions may allow law violations to pay in expected terms. In situations outside
the reach of the legal system, society relies on the willingness of its citizens to uphold
justice and enforce norm compliance on their behalf.
Evidence stemming from the field and the laboratory suggests that people (such
as bystanders or acquaintances) are indeed willing to compensate victims and to
punish wrongdoers even when they themselves are not affected by the norm violation
and despite intervention being personally costly (Fehr and Gächter, 2002; Fehr and
Fischbacher, 2004). Because such interventions cannot be explained by models of
standard self-interest, they are often claimed to originate from an altruistic concern
for the well-being of others and from a preference for norm compliance.
It is now well established in the experimental literature, however, that seemingly
altruistic behaviour in a variety of games is often motivated by extrinsic factors such
as social pressure or concerns over how actions reflect on one’s social- or self-image
(Cain, Dana and Newman, 2014). Generosity in dictator games, for instance, is
significantly reduced under conditions which credibly secure anonymity (Hoffman
et al., 1994; Hoffman, McCabe and Smith, 1996). It has also been documented that
people are biased in self-serving directions. They, for instance, interpret ambiguity
about the consequences of their actions, other people’s intentions, or the resolution
of uncertainty in ways which best align with their own self-interest (Dana, Weber
and Kuang, 2007; Di Tella et al., 2015; Exley, 2015; Haisley and Weber, 2010). We
suspect similar forces to be at work in the domain of third-party intervention.
Previous research has mainly relied on the use of two experimental paradigms to
study people’s willingness to intervene altruistically: the Third-Party Punishment
Game and the Third-Party Compensation Game (TPPG and TPCG, respectively).
In these games, a “third-party” observes the outcome of a dictator game played
between two other players and subsequently decides whether to incur a cost to punish
the dictator (in the TPPG) or compensate the recipient (in the TPCG). A common
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feature of these games is that the dictator’s actions transparently map into outcomes
which means that a third-party can easily assess the degree to which the dictator
behaves selfishly and violates the focal norm of distributional equality. This is not
necessarily the case in the real world where uncertainty may arise over a perpetrators
underlying intentions or the severity of harm inflicted on a victim. For instance,
a bystander might witness a person verbally insulting or physically approaching
another on the street, not knowing the cause of this action or how much of an impact
the insult or the approach has on the victim’s mental or physical well-being. Under
uncertainty, the bystander might withhold intervention by telling himself that the
offence “probably wasn’t that bad”.15 Uncertainty is also present in situations where
bystanders have to step in to prevent a foreseeable norm transgression. Imagine
you observe a verbal dispute between two people. You anticipate that one of two
things will happen: (i) the parties will resolve the conflict peacefully, or, (ii) the
conflict escalates and immediate harm is the consequence. As a bystander, you
consider whether or not to intervene. If you prefer to avoid getting involved, you
may convince yourself that scenario (i) is most likely to happen.
In this paper, we seek to investigate two questions. Firstly, will third-parties
intervene at a cost to prevent potential harm? To answer this question, we designed
a third-party intervention game which features uncertainty about the existence and
severity of norm violation. Secondly, will subjects exploit the existing uncertainty in
a self-serving way so as to avoid costly interventions? To the best of our knowledge,
our study is the first to investigate the role of self-serving belief formation in altruistic
third-party intervention.
The remainder of this paper is structured as follows. Section 2.2 reviews the
related literature in more detail. Section 2.3 elaborates on the experimental design,
hypotheses, procedures and results of our main experiment. In Section 2.4 we present
the design and results of a follow-up experiment. Section 2.5 contains a general
discussion. Section 2.6 concludes the analysis.
2.2 Related Literature
In this section, we consecutively review the literatures on third-party intervention
(Section 2.2.1) and belief distortion (Section 2.2.2).
2.2.1 Third-Party Intervention
An intervention more generally refers to an intentional action of becoming involved
in a situation with the aim of improving it or preventing it from getting worse.
15A similar story is told by Bicchieri (2006, p. 182) about bystanders to emergencies being afraid
of embarrassing themselves by overreacting. Trying to figure out if there is a cause for concern,
they interpret the inaction of others as a sign that “probably there is nothing to worry about”.
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The experimental literature has mainly focused on the former by studying people’s
willingness to restore justice following a norm transgression. The most prominent
experimental approaches to the study of third-party intervention allow subjects in
the lab to either punish a norm transgressor or to compensate the victim of a norm
transgression. Because these interventions are privately costly and are carried out
by subjects who are not directly affected by the norm transgression, they are often
referred to as “altruistic” interventions.
In the well-known Third-Party Punishment Game (TPPG; Fehr and Fischbacher,
2004), for example, three players (A, B, and C) are endowed with an equally sized
amount of money. Player A (the dictator) is given the opportunity to transfer
an amount of money from B’s (the victim’s) account to his own. Player C (the
third-party) observes A’s decision and can decide to punish A by deducing his
earnings at a personal cost. In the seminal paper on the TPPG, almost two-thirds
of third-parties in the experiment punished violations of the distributional fairness
norm and punishment increased the more the norm was violated.
Many studies have enriched the basic game by taking into account features
which are frequently present in real-world settings. Nikiforakis and Mitchell (2014)
enriched a third-party’s choice set by allowing for both punishment and reward.16
They find that the demand for costly punishment is reduced in presence of reward
opportunities. The authors propose an additional rationale for punishment which
cannot be explained by preferences over material payoff distributions, namely, the
signalling of disapproval. In the presence of reward opportunities, many individuals
signal their disapproval by withholding reward.
A relative reluctance to punish has been identified in environments which allowed
third-parties the additional opportunity of compensating the victim of a norm
transgression. In Chavez and Bicchieri (2013) and Lotz et al. (2011), for instance,
subjects restored justice more often through compensation. This is consistent with
the “do-no-harm” principle according to which people are reluctant to inflict harm
on others (Molenmaker, de Kwaadsteniet and van Dijk, 2016). In a study where
punishment decisions were reached either individually or in a group, Molenmaker,
de Kwaadsteniet and van Dijk (2016) find that groups are more willing to impose
punishment than individuals. The authors argue that the diffusion of responsibility
in groups alleviates the restrain that individuals experience when they are solely
responsible for the implementation of punishments.
Several studies have questioned the robustness of altruistic punishment and
compensation from a methodological viewpoint by claiming that elements of the
standard design allow for alternative explanations (see e.g. Pedersen, Kurzban and
McCullough, 2013). Jordan, McAuliffe and Rand (2016) address two such concerns,
16The relevance of choice sets has previously been reported in the domain of dictator game
generosity by Bardsley (2008) and List (2007).
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namely, that punishment could be motivated by envy (as selfish dictators earn higher
payoffs), or could be influenced by the use of the strategy method (as subjects
might infer and comply with the experimenter’s research hypothesis). None of
the manipulation, however, significantly affected punishment. Another concern
addresses audience effects. Varying conditions of anonymity, Kurzban, DeScioli and
O’Brien (2007) indeed find an effect of norm violation on third-party punishment
in Trust and Prisoner’s Dilemma games. In the former, e.g., 67% of third-parties
punished when other participants could observe the decision, while only 42% did so
when anonymity was credibly secured.
Although extrinsic factors are shown to matter, overall the literature supports the
idea that third-parties also care intrinsically about the compliance with norms and
the well-being of others. One potentially relevant aspect however has yet received
little attention in the aforementioned analyses: the role of self-image concerns.
Self-image concerns arise from a person’s desire to arrive at a positive self -assessment
when reflecting on one’s own actions. An internal tension or discomfort is experienced
where these actions mismatch a person’s moral ideals. Insufficiently accounted for
in previous research is the idea that the cause or severity of an interpersonal conflict
may be uncertain and that bystanders who should feel obliged to intervene can
exploit the inherent uncertainty in self-serving ways. By holding favourable or
motivated beliefs e.g. about the underlying level of aggression of a perpetrator
or the harm imposed on a victim, a third-party may reduce his or her efforts in
resolving the conflict without suffering any moral discomfort.
2.2.2 Perception Manipulation
Cognitive dissonance theory (Festinger, 1962) proposes that people try to achieve
internal consistency between their opinions or beliefs and their actions. A tension
or dissonance is experienced where these aspects conflict as is the case for example
when someone desires to be selfish but dislikes being perceived in a negative light
either by others or by himself. In such situations, people can reduce the experienced
tension e.g. by reducing self-interested behaviour or by engaging in self-deception.
A vast body of research has documented that other-regarding behaviour in the
lab is reduced when subjects can obfuscate responsibility for outcomes or when being
enabled to process information in self-serving ways. To provide a few examples,
Konow (2000) and Rodriguez-Lara and Moreno-Garrido (2012) show that subjects
who face allocation decisions selectively employ justice principles which best align
with their own financial self-interest. Dana, Weber and Kuang (2007) demonstrate
that subjects in binary dictator games are more selfish when they can remain
wilfully ignorant about the consequences of their actions for their counterpart. Exley
(2015) shows that subjects use risk as an excuse not to give to charity. Hamman,
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Loewenstein and Weber (2010) argue that individuals use delegation to avoid the
discomfort of having to implement selfish decisions themselves. Haisley and Weber
(2010) show that subjects use ambiguity in an experimental labor market as an
excuse for letting-off workers.
In a study closely related to ours, Di Tella et al. (2015) document that subjects
distort their beliefs about others’ altruism to justify their own selfish behaviour. In
their experiment, subjects are matched in groups of two and are assigned either the
“allocator” or the “seller” role. Each player is endowed with 10 tokens. Actions are
chosen simultaneously. The allocator chooses how many tokens to transfer from the
seller to himself. The seller determines the price at which both players can cash their
tokens in at the end of the experiment. The seller chooses between (i) £2 per token,
or (ii) £1 per token. Moreover, the seller receives an additional side payment of £10
if he chooses the low token value.17 After decisions are made, allocators are asked
to guess the percentage of subjects in the seller role choosing the small token value;
this percentage is their main outcome variable. Correct guesses are rewarded with a
substantial bonus. There are two conditions. In able=2, allocators are constrained to
transfer a maximum of 2 tokens to their account. In able=8, allocators can transfer
up to 8 tokens. Importantly, allocators are treated silently, meaning that the seller
is uninformed which constraint applies to a matched allocator. Consequently, the
allocator’s belief regarding the likelihood that the seller chose the low token value
should not differ across conditions. In accordance with their research hypothesis,
however, allocators in the able=8 condition believe that a higher percentage of
sellers chose the low token value compared to allocators in the able=2 condition
(69% compared to 49%). Since in able=8, greater selfishness is possible, allocators
have a higher incentive to manipulate their beliefs about the seller’s type to justify
taking more tokens; in other words, they are conveniently upset.
Although we borrow design features from Di Tella et al. and likewise look at
motivated beliefs, the angle from which we approach this topic is different from
theirs. Di Tella et al. look at motivated beliefs of second -parties who are directly
affected (in monetary terms) by the misconduct of their counterpart. On the
contrary, we investigate the formation of motivated beliefs by third -parties who
are financially unaffected. In our setup, the focus is on concerns over perceived
morality and we aim to investigate whether third-parties generate convenient beliefs
which allow them to withhold costly interventions. Another difference concerns
the predicted direction of distorted beliefs: whereas subjects in Di Tella et al.
are predicted to generate negative beliefs about a counterpart to justify selfish
actions, subjects in our experiment have to generate positive beliefs about the likely
behaviour of a potential norm transgressor to justify a lack of intervention.
17The authors also refer to their game as a “corruption” game, namely a dictator game where
the recipient can reduce the size of the pie in exchange for a side payment.
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2.3 Experiment 1
We conducted two experiments to explore the role of belief distortions for third-party
behaviour. Experiment 1 was designed to provide an environment which offers room
for belief distortions to evolve. This experiment however does not allow to provide
a causal interpretation of the effect of observed beliefs (and possible distortions
thereof) on behaviour for reasons which will be outlined below. Experiment 2 is a
complementary study which induces exogenous variation of beliefs, thereby allowing
us to obtain a better understanding of the relationship between beliefs and behaviour
in our experiment.
2.3.1 Design
We introduce a modification of the conventional third-party intervention paradigms
(TPPG and TPCG; see introduction) which features uncertainty about the existence
and severity of norm violation.
As in the conventional games, there are three roles in our game: Player A (the
dictator), Player B (the victim), and Player C (the third-party). Players A and B
start with an equal endowment of 10 tokens in their accounts. These tokens are
worth £0.80 per unit. Player A has a chance of transferring tokens from passive
Player B’s account to his own by claiming tokens from Player B’s account. We
denote Player A’s claim by c ∈ {0, 1, 2, . . . , 10}. The actual transfer however can
differ from Player A’s claim depending on the behaviour of Player C.
Player C (whose behaviour we are ultimately interested in) is endowed with
tokens worth £16. By sacrificing some of her own tokens at a cost, Player C can
protect any number of Player B’s tokens from being transferred. We denote Player
C’s decision of how many of Player B’s tokens to protect by p ∈ {0, 1, 2, . . . , 10}.
The transfer, denoted by t, is determined by the function t = max{0, c− p} which
means that tokens which are claimed but not protected are transferred from Player
B’s to Player A’s account.
Uncertainty is introduced by letting Players A and C decide simultaneously.18
This means that Player C decides how many tokens to protect not knowing how
many tokens Player A will claim. Similarly, Player A decides how many tokens to
claim not knowing how many tokens Player C will protect.
Since a prerequisite of testing the strength of moral norms is to create an
environment where these norms are salient, we opted for a rather loaded frame that
(i) used terms such as “claim”, “take”, and “protect” in the instructions and (ii) also
visualised these concepts graphically. Figure 2.1 illustrates how we implemented the
game in the laboratory by providing a screenshot of Player C’s decision interface.
18Appendix 2.A compares our game with a sequential move game with incomplete information.
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Figure 2.1: Player C’s Decision Screen
Note: Arrows were not part of the original screen and were added to illustrate motion.
Player A was in control of the hand above Player B’s account which allowed him
to indicate his token claim. By selecting one of the tokens of Player B’s account,
that token and all tokens to its left would be claimed. Claimed tokens were flagged
in a player-specific blue colour. Recall that due to the simultaneous move structure
of our game, it was impossible for Player C to know what the actual token claim was
until the end of the experiment. In order to make the simultaneous move structure
and the uncertainty surrounding players’ decisions more comprehensible to subjects,
we simulated the choice process of a counterpart on players’ screens. In the case of
Player C, this meant that the hand indicating the claim would move up and down
along Player B’s account whilst Player C was deciding how many tokens to protect.19
Player C could indicate his protection decision by activating padlocks of Player
B’s account. Selecting a padlock meant that the respective padlock together with
all padlocks to its left would activate and click into place. Activated padlocks
19Similarly so, Player A’s decision screen simulated Player C’s decision process and Player B’s
waiting screen simulated both Player A’s and Player B’s decision processes. Screenshots of Player
A’s and B’s decision interfaces can be found in Appendix 2.B.
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prevented tokens above them from being claimed. Whilst activating padlocks, Player
C saw some of his own tokens disappear as a consequence of protection being costly.
Choices however were non-binding until a minimum of 150 seconds elapsed and a
button appeared on screen allowing subjects to confirm their final decision. We
thought that a minimum time requirement would increase the chances that subjects
would engage with the task and as a consequence form beliefs about the likely
behaviour of their counterpart. These beliefs are the focus of our investigation.
The described game was repeated over three rounds. After each round, subjects
were re-matched ensuring that no subject would ever interact with another one for
more than one round. At the same time, we rotated their roles such that, by the
end of the experiment, every subject had played once as Player A, once as Player B,
and once as Player C. The roles were rotated in a clockwise order such that a third
of our subjects played the order A → B → C, another third played B → C → A,
and the remaining third played C → A → B. Subjects were informed that only one
of the three rounds would randomly be selected at the end of the experiment to be
payoff relevant. This feature of our design allowed us to increase the number of data
points collected for C-Players whilst preserving the one-shot nature of interactions.
The treatment assigned was a variation of Player C’s protection cost. In a low
cost condition (L-Cost), the cost of protecting Player B’s tokens was merely £0.20
per unit whereas in a high cost condition (H-Cost) the cost was quadrupled to £0.80
per unit. It was common knowledge to all subjects that for any given round, the
computer would independently assign one of the two cost conditions with equal
probability to the C-Player of the respective round. Importantly, only Player C
herself learned which cost condition applied to her in a given round. The privacy of
this information was moreover maintained beyond the concluding outcome stage of
the experiment where subjects were merely informed about the claim and protection
rates that applied in the payoff relevant round, not however about the assigned cost
condition or the final payoffs of the selected C-Player. We further elaborate on the
significance of this “silent” treatment design in the hypotheses section of our paper.
For every round of the experiment, we elicited Player C’s beliefs about the claim
following his protection decision. Figure 2.2 illustrates what C-Players saw on their
screen. We asked them to consider all A-Players of a given round (excluding the one
of their own group) and to guess in which bracket (out of 10) the average claim of
these A-Players would fall.20 We incentivised the accuracy of beliefs by rewarding
correct guesses with a non-negligible bonus of £5 which was added to subjects’ final
earnings at the end of the experiment.
20We asked not to consider the A-Player of one’s own group to align the current design with
that of Experiment 2 where we elicited protection choices using a strategy method approach. This
exclusion was necessary to preserve the uncertainty about a counterpart’s actual behaviour in that
experiment. More details will follow in Section 2.4.1.
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Figure 2.2: Belief Elicitation Screen
2.3.2 Hypotheses
The core hypothesis our experiment was designed to test is that C-Players form
motivated beliefs about the type of a matched A-Player to reduce the level of costly
protection they feel obliged to provide. Recall that C-Players were treated silently,
i.e. their assigned cost condition was private information. Since A-Players never
learn which cost condition applied to a matched C-Player in a given round, A-Player
behaviour cannot depend on the assigned cost condition. Under the assumption
of rationality in C-Players’ beliefs about the behaviour of A-Players, C-Players’
beliefs should not depend on the assigned cost condition either. Our null hypothesis
therefore states:
Hyp. 0: C-Players’ beliefs about the claim are independent of whether the treatment
is L-Cost or H-Cost.
If however, C-Players looked for ways to avoid costly protection, without having
to suffer any moral discomfort, they could convince themselves that less protection
is needed. The alternative hypothesis is about non-rationality in C-Players’ beliefs:
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Hyp. 1: Beliefs about the claim are lower under H-Cost than L-Cost.
Our high cost condition was calibrated with the aim of providing sufficient
incentives for belief distortions to evolve. Notice that we contrast this condition
with an alternative where protection is extremely cheap; full protection can already
be implemented at a small cost of £2 out of £16. The idea is that subjects in the
low cost condition face less of an incentive to distort their beliefs since the monetary
benefit of doing so (evading protection costs) is rather small. Consequently, we
expect beliefs under this condition to be closer to subjects’ true (or, undistorted)
beliefs.
We assume that subjects distort their beliefs to evade a perceived obligation to
protect.21 Under this interpretation, we would expect fewer tokens to be protected
under H-Cost than L-Cost.
Hyp. 2: C-Players protect fewer tokens under H-Cost than L-Cost.
Our discussed belief channel is not the only possible explanation for differences
in observed protection. First of all, the cost variation itself is expected to affect
protection. Second of all, the cost variation changes the relative payoff distributions
that can be obtained between treatments as a result of the protection decision. In
Section 2.4 we present a follow-up experiment which induces exogenous variation of
beliefs and which allows us to control for these alternative explanations.
2.3.3 Procedures
The experiment was programmed in z-Tree (Fischbacher, 2007) and conducted in
the Laboratory for Economic and Decision Research (LEDR) at the University of
East Anglia. A total of 144 participants recruited from the local student population
took part in the study. We conducted 8 sessions in the Autumn of 2018, each of
which lasting around 50 minutes. 18 participants took part in each session. Average
earnings were £13.70, with a minimum of £3 and a maximum of £24 (including a
£3 participation fee).
Upon arrival, participants were randomly assigned to computer terminals by
drawing their desk number. Each computer was located in a separate cubicle which
inhibited visual interaction or communication. Anonymity amongst participants
was secured because at no point during or after the experiment did any participant
receive identifying information about his or her peers. We also took great care
in the instructions emphasising that the experimenter would not be able to link
the generated data to any participant as a person. Participants received a hard
copy of the instructions and were asked to follow along as the experimenter read
21Belief distortions can also occur for non-instrumental reasons. We address this possibility in
Section 2.5.
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the instructions out aloud. The instructions included hands-on exercises meant
to familiarise subjects with the stages, screens, and mechanisms of the following
experiment. Clarifications were provided on an individual basis. Participants were
asked to answer a set of five control questions following the instructions. The
experiment concluded with a brief questionnaire asking for demographic information
and an assessment of the difficulty of the experimental tasks. Privacy was guaranteed
during the payment phase by asking participants to individually collect their final
earnings from an experimental assistant at the end of the experiment.
2.3.4 Results
All data referred to in this section is also subsumed in Table 2.1 which provides
summary statistics on various outcomes of our experiment, all broken down by
treatment and role order.
2.3.4.1 Protection Behaviour
Figure 2.3 depicts a breakdown of average protection behaviour in our experiment.
We find that irrespective of the order of roles by which subjects encountered the







































































Experiment 1 144 3.6 8.3 7.3 0.28***
H-Cost (£0.80) 73 2.4 8.4 7.1 0.24**
A–B–C 26 2.4 8.8 7.3 0.17
B–C–A 23 2.3 7.9 6.8 0.25
C–A–B 24 2.5 8.3 7.1 0.34
L-Cost (£0.20) 71 4.8 8.3 7.5 0.29**
A–B–C 22 4.6 8.8 7.5 0.27
B–C–A 25 4.8 8.0 7.3 0.34*
C–A–B 24 4.9 8.0 7.6 0.23
Note: Rows 4-6 and 8-10 break the data down by the order of roles that subjects encountered in the experiment. Columns 3 and 4 report the average number of tokens protected
or claimed, respectively. Column 5 relates to the belief band that C-Players expected the average out-group claim would fall in. Column 6 reports the spearman correlation
coefficient between the number of tokens protected and C-Players’ beliefs.
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three rounds of the experiment, subjects protected fewer tokens when protection
was relatively more expensive. Pooling across role orders, the average amount of
tokens protected under L-Cost is twice that of H-Cost (4.8 vs. 2.4; Z = 3.744, p <
0.01, one-tailed), thereby supporting hypothesis 2.
Result 1. C-Players protect fewer tokens under H-Cost than L-Cost.
It is reasonable to expect C-Players to protect less as a consequence of protection
being more costly. For subjects with moral concerns however, protecting less could
still be quite costly as such subjects may experience a disutility from acting against
what they think is the morally correct action. One way of avoiding both types of
costs (i.e., pecuniary and moral) is to convince oneself that A-Players will claim
fewer tokens.
2.3.4.2 Beliefs about the Claim
Before testing our main hypothesis of distorted beliefs, it is worthwhile to look at
the relationship between reported beliefs and protection behaviour more generally.




























Belief about the Claim
H-Cost Fitted Values (H-Cost)
L-Cost Fitted Values (L-Cost)
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Figure 2.4 depicts the associated scatter plots for each cost condition. The x-axis
refers to the belief category (out of 10) chosen by a subject, whereby “0” indicates
the lowest category (average claim less than 1) and “9” indicates the highest category
(average claim of 9 or more). As is evident from the graph, reported beliefs about
the claim correlate positively with the number of tokens protected by a subject
under both cost conditions (Spearman correlation coefficient = 0.28, p < 0.01, for
the pooled sample). While we acknowledge that such a correlation is insufficient to
prove a causal relationship between beliefs and behaviour for reasons such as reverse
causality, it is at least compatible with the idea that subjects in our experiment acted
on their beliefs. This premise gives rise to the idea that subjects could have distorted
their beliefs instrumentally, to reduce the level of protection they felt obliged to
provide.
To look for evidence of belief distortions, we first inspected reported belief
averages which are broken down by treatment and role order in Figure 2.5. What
we find is that for all role orders, average beliefs about the claim are lower in
the high cost compared to the low cost condition. Belief differences also appear
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more pronounced for C-Players who had no prior experience as A-Players. However,
according to Kruskall-Wallis tests, reported beliefs are statistically indistinguishable
across the three role orders (L-Cost: chi2 = 0.167, p = 0.915; H-Cost: chi2 =
0.532, p = 0.760). This justifies pooling the data across the role order dimension.
For the pooled data, Figure 2.6 depicts the distributions of beliefs (about the
average out-group claim) for each cost condition separately and also contrasts them
with the distribution of empirical out-group claims. What we find is a mildly
significant difference in beliefs about the claim between our cost conditions in the
direction predicted by hypothesis 1 (mean: 7.1 vs. 7.5; ranksum test, Z = 1.434, p =
0.076, one-tailed).
Result 2. There is mild evidence of lower beliefs about the claim under H-Cost
compared to L-Cost. This finding is consistent with the idea that subjects entertain
motivated beliefs to evade the costs of protection.
It is also interesting to see that subjects – more generally – appear to hold too
optimistic beliefs about the generosity of A-Players. Even when taking condition
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L-Cost as the baseline (where we assumed incentives for belief distortions to be
small) we find that beliefs about the average claim are significantly smaller as
compared to the empirical claims (mean: 7.5 vs. 8.3; ranksum test, Z = −2.071, p =
0.038).
Result 3. We find that irrespective of incentives, C-Players underestimate A-Player
opportunism.
One question which the current experiment is unable to answer is how much of an
impact on behaviour the identified belief differences had. Such an identification is
confounded under the current design by the simultaneous variation of protection
costs and beliefs as well as the endogenous nature of reported beliefs. In the
following experiment, we induce exogenous variation of beliefs in an otherwise similar
experimental environment to obtain a better understanding of the likely impact that




The design of experiment 2 closely resembled that of experiment 1, apart from two
important changes. Firstly, there was no cost variation, the cost of protection was
equivalent to the H-Cost scenario of the previous experiment, i.e. 80p per padlock.
Secondly, instead of letting subjects form their beliefs about the claim endogenously
as in experiment 1, here we asked C-Players to condition their protection decision
on a total of 10 possible scenarios. Each of these scenarios covered one of the 10
belief bands about the average out-group claim used to elicit beliefs in experiment 1.
Subjects were asked to submit one protection decision under each scenario and were
told that if a respective round was chosen to be payoff relevant, the experimenter
would implement the protection decision made under the true scenario, i.e. the
scenario that corresponded to the true average out-group claim.
Figure 2.7 provides a screenshot of a subject’s decision interface for one of the
scenarios. To avoid anchoring effects, we randomised the order by which belief bands
mapped onto the sequence of scenarios. As in the previous experiment, there was
a minimum time requirement on each screen which however decreased as subjects
moved through the scenarios. We also took great care in the instructions and the
preceding practice stage in familiarising subjects with the conditional nature of
decisions under the current design. A set of control questions was used to check that
subjects understood the details of the experiment. The instructions for experiment
2 are provided in Appendix 2.B.4.
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Figure 2.7: Player C’s Decision Screen for Scenario 1
Note: Arrows were not part of the original screen and were added to illustrate motion.
2.4.2 Procedures
The procedures closely followed those of experiment 1. Since we generate richer
C-Player data under the current within-subject design, we recruited a smaller sample
of 54 subjects. We conducted 3 sessions with 18 subjects each in the Spring of 2019.
Sessions lasted around 50 minutes. Average earnings were £11.5, with a minimum
of £3 and a maximum of £19 (including a £3 participation fee).
2.4.3 Results
Table 2.2 provides summary statistics on various outcomes of experiment 2, broken
down by the order of roles. The first thing to notice is that the reported summary
statistics seem to resemble those obtained under the H-Cost condition of experiment
1 quite closely. Evidence of role order effects is small, with the only apparent
difference (again) being that subjects who start off as A-Players in round 1 of
the experiment claim relatively more tokens. None of the reported differences in
behaviour across the role order dimension however reach statistical significance.
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Pooled 54 2.6 8.4 0.34***
A-B-C 18 2.8 8.8 0.38***
B-C-A 18 2.5 8.4 0.30***
C-A-B 18 2.6 8.0 0.37***
Note: Rows 3-5 break the data down by the order of roles that subjects encountered in the experiment.
Columns 3 and 4 report the average number of tokens protected or claimed, respectively. Column 5 reports
the spearman correlation coefficient between the number of tokens protected and the belief bands shown.
Table 2.3: Random Effects Tobit Model Estimations


































n 540 540 540
Note: Scenario is the belief band for which a certain protection decision was elicited. Standard errors are
reported in parentheses. *(**, ***): coefficient significantly different from zero at the 10% (5%, 1%) level.
The advantage of experiment 2 is that it induces exogenous variation of beliefs
about the claim by asking C-Players to condition their protection decision on a
vector of possible claims. To identify the effect of beliefs on protection behaviour
we ran random effects tobit model estimations which take into account the panel
structure of our data and the censoring of our dependent variable. The results are
provided in Table 2.3. As a robustness check, we included two specifications which
allow the effect of beliefs on protection behaviour to vary by the order of roles. As
already suggested by the summary statistics however, we again find no evidence of
role order effects in our experiment. Arriving at our final specification we find that
an increase in the belief scenario by 1 belief band, ceteris paribus, is predicted to
increases the number of tokens protected by 0.44 tokens.
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2.5 General Discussion
The objective of experiment 2 was to isolate the causal effect of belief variations
on protection behaviour and – given the similarity of designs – to thereby provide
us with an estimate of the likely role that belief variations must have played in
experiment 1. Before we proceed with a discussion of our results, we want to briefly
address some of the potential weaknesses of our experimental design.
One might criticise our design on the grounds that the strategy method used
in experiment 2 makes it more susceptible to experimenter demand effects. This
could result in an overstatement of the effects of beliefs on behaviour. While we
acknowledge that this is a valid concern, a survey of the literature comparing the
strategy method to the direct response method suggests that both typically yield
similar results (Brandts and Charness, 2011). Moreover, if the strategy method used
in experiment 2 induced subjects to be more responsive to our treatment, we would
expect a stronger correlation between beliefs and protection compared to experiment
1. This however was not the case as can be shown by a comparison of spearman rank
correlations for the range of beliefs with common empirical support in both studies
(r
s
= 0.237 vs. r
s
= 0.241)22; in fact, the correlations are very similar suggesting
that our estimates have not been biased by an experimenter demand effect.
Another potential issue concerns the timing of our belief elicitation stage which
took place after protection decisions had been made. Our decision to let subjects
engage with the decision environment first was motivated by the assumption that
convenient beliefs would more readily be formed when subjects were given enough
time to experience the potential consequences of their actions. Recall that we
used a rather loaded frame which also simulated the possible choice outcomes of a
counterpart. Moreover, we implemented a minimum time requirement to further
increase the chances that subjects would engage with the decision environment
and as a consequence form beliefs about the likely behaviour of their counterpart.
Although it is true that reported beliefs in our experiment could be the result of
subjects adapting convenient beliefs to justify their choices ex-post, we believe such
a strategy by which beliefs are distorted for non-instrumental reasons to be very
costly in light of the high incentives that we provide for accurate beliefs.
Turning to a discussion of our results, we can connect the findings obtained across
the two experiments to obtain an estimate of the likely role that belief differences
played in our study. In experiment 1 we found that on average C-Players reduced
their protection by (4.8− 2.4 =) 2.4 tokens due to the cost increase. This reduction
was accompanied by a mildly significant distortion of beliefs in the magnitude of
(7.5− 7.1 =) 0.4 tokens. Under the assumption that subjects distorted their beliefs
22Whereas experiment 2 by design generates a belief distribution with full support, in experiment
1 no subject reported a belief about the claim of less than 3 tokens.
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instrumentally – i.e. to justify protecting less – the results of experiment 2 suggest






7.3% of the decrease in the number of tokens protected. Instead, what
appears to have mattered most is the material cost of providing protection.
Although evidence of strategically distorted beliefs is weak in our experiment,
an interesting finding is that subjects more generally held too optimistic beliefs
about the generosity of A-Players. As a consequence, de-biasing third-parties e.g.
through the transmission of empirical information on the severity of offences may
be a desirable policy intervention to increase third-party involvement.23
2.6 Conclusion
In situations outside the reach of the legal system, society often relies on the
willingness of its citizens to uphold justice and to enforce norm compliance on
their behalf. A large body of literature has documented that third-parties who
are not directly affected by a norm violation are nonetheless willing to intervene
at a personal cost to secure or restore justice. The aim of our paper was to
investigate whether such “altruistic” interventions would also survive in environments
which allow to morally excuse non-intervention. More specifically, we introduced
uncertainty in a third-party protection game and hypothesised that subjects would
– as a consequence of protection being costly – entertain motivated beliefs allowing
them to evade a moral obligation to protect.
Not very surprisingly, we observed that subjects protected fewer tokens when the
cost of protection increased. We found that this reduction was accompanied by a
reduction of subjects’ beliefs about the claim which is consistent with the idea that
subjects entertained motivated beliefs to evade a moral obligation to protect. The
discovered belief differences however merely reached marginal significance. Moreover,
the relevance of belief distortions for behaviour in our experiment appeared to
be small; our estimates suggest that merely 7.3% of the variation in protection
behaviour could potentially be attributed to the distortion of beliefs. Instead, what
appears to have mattered most is the material cost of providing protection.
Despite the weak influence of strategically distorted beliefs in our experiment, we
observe support of subjects exhibiting a general bias of perceiving dictators as more
generous than they really are. In light of this finding, we think that the societal
transmission of information e.g. about the severity of various civil offences could
help de-bias the general population and thereby increase their likelihood to intervene
as third-parties confronted with immoral behaviour in the field.
23It is worth noting that our policy implication contrasts with the more familiar nudging
argument (e.g. in relation to organ donation, recycling, tax compliance) that people underestimate
norm compliance and need to be told how pro-social the average person is (see e.g. Thaler and
Sunstein, 2009). The recent norm-nudge literature is discussed by Bicchieri and Dimant (2019).
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Appendix for Chapter 2
2.A Sequential Game Comparison
We acknowledge that our game could have also been modelled differently, e.g. as a
sequential game with incomplete information regarding the type of Player A. As an
example, consider a game where nature privately assigns one of two types to Player
A: either (i) Player A is free to claim any number of tokens from Player B (in which
case protection might become needed), or (ii) Player A is unable to claim any tokens
from Player B (in which case protection becomes redundant). In the sequential
version, Player C moves first knowing that two types of A-Players exist, not however
the probabilities with which types are assigned. A procedure akin to Weber and
Haisley (2010) could be used who let subjects know that the true probability is
drawn from a uniformly distributed set of different probabilities. In this game,
C-Players would be asked whether they believed to be matched with an “impaired”
or “active” A-Player. The higher the cost of protection, the more C-Players may
adopt the convenient belief of impairment which would make protection redundant.
Under such a design however, C-Players would form beliefs about a parameter
of the experiment, with very little information to base their beliefs on. We prefer
our design on the grounds that beliefs are formed about the behaviour of A-Players;
C-Players know the problem that A-Players face and the subject pool from which
they were recruited. C-Players are therefore able to make intelligent guesses about
the behaviour of A-Players even without actually knowing the probability.
2.B Instructions and Screens
2.B.1 Experiment 1 Instructions
Instructions
Welcome to this experiment and thank you for participating. Please follow along
carefully as the experimenter reads the instructions out aloud. The purpose of this
experiment is to study how people make decisions in particular situations. You were
awarded £3 for showing up on time. Your additional earnings in this experiment
depend on the decisions you and other participants make during the experiment
and on chance. At the end of the experiment, the entire amount will be paid to you
individually and privately in cash by an assistant.
Please do not speak to other participants during the experiment and keep your
phones switched off. If you have any questions at any time over the course of the
experiment, please raise your hand and an experimenter will come to assist you.
Note that your behaviour in this experiment is recorded by the computer and stored
in a database. The records of this database are anonymous, i.e. not traceable to
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you as a person. For accounting reasons only, you will be asked to fill in and sign a
receipt of your earnings at the end of the experiment. To secure anonymity, these
receipts will be kept entirely separate from any data on your behaviour generated
in the experiment.
Please remain seated until you are individually asked by the experimenter to collect
your final earnings at the end of the experiment.
The Experiment
In this experiment, a task will be performed for three rounds. At the beginning of
the first round, you will randomly be assigned one of three possible roles: Player
A, Player B, or Player C. You will then be allocated to a group which includes one
Player A, one Player B, and one Player C.
At the beginning of each of the following two rounds, your group and your role
in the experiment will change. You will be assigned to an entirely new group of
participants in each round which means that you will never be matched with any
other participant in the room for more than one round. Moreover, you will be
assigned a different role in each of the three rounds. At the end of the experiment,
every participant will have played once as Player A, once as Player B, and once as
Player C.
In every round, you will start with a freshly generated amount of ‘tokens’ in your
private account. Depending on your decisions and/or the decisions of your group
members, the amount of tokens in your account can change. Every token has a
specific monetary value attached to it.
At the end of the final round, the computer will randomly select one of the three
rounds of the experiment to determine your final earnings. Your earnings will then
be equal to the value of all the tokens which you hold in your private account at the
end of the selected round.
The Task
In every round, players start with an endowment of tokens. The total value of a




In the task, Player A will have a chance to claim tokens from Player B’s account and
Player C will have a chance to protect Player B’s tokens from being claimed. When
we say claim, we mean trying to take. Tokens which are claimed but not protected
will be transferred to Player A’s account at the end of a given round.
Please have a look on screen where you can see how to claim and protect
tokens. You will be told by the experimenter when to return to the paper
instructions.
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—————————– Start of on-screen practice —————————–
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—————————– End of on-screen practice —————————–
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Different Costs of Protection
The cost of activating a padlock in the main part of the experiment can vary and
will either be 20p or 80p. In every round, the computer will randomly select one of
the two possible costs with equal probability. Only Player C and no other player will
ever find out which cost applied in a particular round and for a particular Player C.
Simultaneous Decisions
Player A and Player C will decide simultaneously, i.e. at the same time, how many
tokens they want to claim or protect. This means that Player A will decide how
many of Player B’s tokens to claim not knowing how many padlocks Player C will
activate. At the same time, Player C will decide how many padlocks to activate not
knowing how many tokens Player A will claim.
Determining Payoffs in a Given Round
Tokens which are claimed but not protected are transferred from Player B’s to Player
A’s account. Therefore,
• Player A’s payoff in a given round is his initial endowment of £8 plus the value
of tokens transferred from Player B’s to Player A’s account.
• Player B’s payoff in a given round is his initial endowment of £8 minus the
value of tokens transferred from Player B’s to Player A’s account.
• Player C’s payoff in a given round is his initial endowment of £16 minus the
cost of all padlocks he activated.
Notice that you will not receive any feedback on outcomes in any of the three rounds
of the experiment until the end of the final round. Remember that one of the three
rounds of the experiment will be selected to determine your earnings at the end of
the experiment and you will only receive feedback on outcomes and your personal
earnings of that specific round.
Bonus: Guessing
In every round of the experiment, some of you will have the opportunity to earn
additional money by guessing outcomes of the experiment. You will learn more
about this during the experiment.
Interface of the Experiment
You already practiced how to claim and protect tokens. We will now take you
through the particular screens that you will encounter in the experiment in all three
roles to further familiarize you with the interface and processes of the experiment.
Please follow along on screen.
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2.B.2 Example Round Screens
Player A Intro Screen
Player A Screen
Note: Arrows were not part of the original screen and were added to illustrate motion.
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Player A Sceen (cont.)
Note: Arrows were not part of the original screen and were added to illustrate motion.
Player C Intro Screen
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Player C Screen
Note: Arrows were not part of the original screen and were added to illustrate motion.
Player C Screen (cont.)
Note: Arrows were not part of the original screen and were added to illustrate motion.
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Player B Intro Screen
Player B Screen
Note: Arrows were not part of the original screen and were added to illustrate motion.
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Results Intro Screen
Round Selection Screen – Example 1
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Results Screen – Example 1
Round Selection Screen – Example 2
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Results Screen – Example 2
Round Selection Screen – Example 3
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Results Screen – Example 3
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2.B.3 Control Questions
Control Question 1:
The data generated in this experiment ...
X is anonymous, neither the experimenter nor other participants will be able to
link my behaviour to me as a person.
links my behaviour in the experiment to me as a person.
links my behaviour in the experiment to me as a person, but only the experi-
menter will be able to make this connection.
Control Question 2:
The experiment has three rounds. Which of the following is true?
I will play different roles, but will interact with the same participants in a
group in all rounds.
X I will play different roles, and interact with different participants in a group
in all rounds.
I will play the same role, but interact with different participants in a group in
all rounds.
Control Question 3:
The sequence of decisions in the experiment is as follows ...
First, Player A chooses how many tokens to claim, then Player C decides how
many tokens to protect.
First, Player C chooses how many tokens to protect, then Player A decides
how many tokens to claim.
X Player A and Player C decide simultaneously (at the same time) how many
tokens to claim and protect.
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Control Question 4 (Experiment 1):
Player C’s cost of activating padlocks in the experiment can either be 20p or 80p.
Which of the following is true?
X Other players will never be informed which cost (20p or 80p) applied to Player
C.
All players will be informed which cost (20p or 80p) applied to Player C.
Only at the end of the experiment will all players be informed which cost (20p
or 80p) applied to Player C.
Control Question 4 (Experiment 2):
Player C makes protection decisions under each of 10 possible scenarios. Which of
the following is true?
One decision will be implemented randomly.
X The decision under the true scenario will be implemented.
Player C can choose which decision to implement.
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2.B.4 Experiment 2 Instructions
Instructions
Welcome to this experiment and thank you for participating. Please follow along
carefully as the experimenter reads the instructions out aloud. The purpose of this
experiment is to study how people make decisions in particular situations. You were
awarded £3 for showing up on time. Your additional earnings in this experiment
depend on the decisions you and other participants make during the experiment
and on chance. At the end of the experiment, the entire amount will be paid to you
individually and privately in cash by an assistant.
Please do not speak to other participants during the experiment and keep your
phones switched off. If you have any questions at any time over the course of the
experiment, please raise your hand and an experimenter will come to assist you.
Note that your behaviour in this experiment is recorded by the computer and stored
in a database. The records of this database are anonymous, i.e. not traceable to
you as a person. For accounting reasons only, you will be asked to fill in and sign a
receipt of your earnings at the end of the experiment. To secure anonymity, these
receipts will be kept entirely separate from any data on your behaviour generated
in the experiment.
Please remain seated until you are individually asked by the experimenter to collect
your final earnings at the end of the experiment.
The Experiment
In this experiment, a task will be performed for three rounds. At the beginning of
the first round, you will randomly be assigned one of three possible roles: Player
A, Player B, or Player C. You will then be allocated to a group which includes one
Player A, one Player B, and one Player C.
At the beginning of each of the following two rounds, your group and your role
in the experiment will change. You will be assigned to an entirely new group of
participants in each round which means that you will never be matched with any
other participant in the room for more than one round. Moreover, you will be
assigned a different role in each of the three rounds. At the end of the experiment,
every participant will have played once as Player A, once as Player B, and once as
Player C.
In every round, you will start with a freshly generated amount of ‘tokens’ in your
private account. Depending on your decisions and/or the decisions of your group
members, the amount of tokens in your account can change. Every token has a
specific monetary value attached to it.
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At the end of the final round, the computer will randomly select one of the three
rounds of the experiment to determine your final earnings. Your earnings will then
be equal to the value of all the tokens which you hold in your private account at the
end of the selected round.
The Task
In every round, players start with an endowment of tokens. The total value of a




In the task, Player A will have a chance to claim tokens from Player B’s account and
Player C will have a chance to protect Player B’s tokens from being claimed. When
we say claim, we mean trying to take. Tokens which are claimed but not protected
will be transferred to Player A’s account at the end of a given round.
Please have a look on screen where you can see how to claim and protect
tokens. You will be told by the experimenter when to return to the paper
instructions.
—————————– Start of on-screen practice —————————–
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—————————– End of on-screen practice —————————–
Cost of Protection
You have already seen that activating padlocks is costly for Player C. The cost of
activating padlocks will be 80p per padlock.
Simultaneous Decisions
Player A and Player C will decide simultaneously, i.e. at the same time, how many
tokens they want to claim or protect. This means that Player A will decide how
many of Player B’s tokens to claim not knowing how many padlocks Player C will
activate. At the same time, Player C will decide how many padlocks to activate not
knowing how many tokens Player A will claim.
Protection under Different Scenarios
Suppose you play as Player C in a given round. Your protection decision is imple-
mented in the following way:
At the end of a given round, the computer will calculate the average claim made
by Players A outside of your own group. Consider the following example: In a
given round, six participants played in the role of Player A. Excluding the Player
A of your own group, the remaining five A-Players claimed 5, 0, 4, 8, and 7 tokens,
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Remember that the average claim is about the behaviour of A-Players outside of
your group and therefore does not include the Player A from within your group.
Still, if you knew what the average claim was, this information could be helpful for
you in guessing/forecasting what the Player A of your own group would do.
In the decision stage of a given round, you as Player C will be asked to make several
protection decisions, one for each of 10 possible scenarios. In every scenario, you
will be presented with a different band in which the average claim could fall. Note
that one (and only one) of the scenarios will be the true scenario, i.e. the scenario
that will cover the true average claim.
In a given round and for a given group, only one protection decision will be imple-
mented, namely the one made under the true scenario.
Even though you do not know which scenario will be the true one when deciding,
we will ask you to think of each scenario as if it was true. Note that it is sensible for
you to treat each scenario as if it was true because amongst the 10 scenarios, one
will indeed be true and therefore affect payoffs in a given round.
Determining Payoffs in a Given Round
After all decisions have been made in a given round, the computer calculates the
average claims. Next, the computer implements Player C’s protection decision made
under the true scenario (i.e. the scenario that corresponds to the true average claim).
Payoffs are then determined as follows:
Tokens which are claimed but not protected are transferred from Player B’s to Player
A’s account. Therefore,
• Player A’s payoff in a given round is his initial endowment of £8 plus the value
of tokens transferred from Player B’s to Player A’s account.
• Player B’s payoff in a given round is his initial endowment of £8 minus the
value of tokens transferred from Player B’s to Player A’s account.
• Player C’s payoff in a given round is his initial endowment of £16 minus the
cost of all padlocks he activated.
Notice that you will not receive any feedback on outcomes in any of the three rounds
of the experiment until the end of the final round. Remember that one of the three
rounds of the experiment will be selected to determine your earnings at the end of
the experiment and you will only receive feedback on outcomes and your personal
earnings of that specific round.
Interface of the Experiment
You already practiced how to claim and protect tokens. We will now take you
through the particular screens that you will encounter in the experiment in all three
roles to further familiarize you with the interface and processes of the experiment.
Please follow along on screen.
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2.B.5 Strategy Method Example Screens
Scenario 1 Intro Screen
Note: Arrows were not part of the original screen and were added to illustrate motion.
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3.1 Introduction
Behavioural economic research has documented that people in important economic
situations are not motivated exclusively by pecuniary self-interest (see e.g. Camerer,
2003). Many of these findings come from controlled and monetarily incentivised
experiments using games such as the Dictator Game (DG) (Forsythe et al., 1994;
Engel, 2011). In the typical DG one person, the dictator, is provided with a sum of
money, and then decides how much money to give to the other person, the recipient.
Average amounts given tend to lie between 20–30% of the surplus (Engel, 2011).
The significant sharing observed in the DG is typically taken as evidence that
the dictator cares not only about his own but also the recipient’s money earnings.
This has been formalised by models of (outcome based) social preferences (see e.g.
Bolton and Ockenfels, 2000; Cooper and Kagel, 2016; Fehr and Schmidt, 1999).
Another, not mutually exclusive, interpretation of the data from the DG is that
people are what we call morally motivated. Their decisions are based on notions
such as entitlement, desert, and need (see e.g. Burrows and Loomes, 1994; Gächter
and Riedl, 2005; Hoffman and Spitzer, 1985; Rutström and Williams, 2000; Cappelen
et al., 2017).
In this paper we measure behaviour and the role of moral reasoning in a new
game, the Costless Sharing Game (CSG). In the CSG one player, the sharer, produces
a valuable resource and decides how much of the resource to costlessly share with
the recipient. The resource in question is thus non-rival but excludable. In other
words, in the CSG the opportunity cost of giving is zero, unlike the DG where it is
strictly positive.24 We vary the existence of a moral argument for sharing based on
entitlement and desert by varying whether the recipient (a) had to solve the same
task that gave rise to the sharer’s resource, or (b) took part as a passive recipient.
Following Cappelen et al. (2017), we call this source of motivation intrinsic moral
motivation.
In addition to this, we seek to understand another factor that may influence
the sharer’s costless sharing decision: How much does the recipient know about
the sharer’s decision and the context in which it is made? Following Cappelen
et al. (2017), we call this source of motivation extrinsic social motivation. Previous
research (see e.g. Andreoni and Bernheim, 2009; Broberg, Ellingsen and Johannesson,
2007; Dana, Cain and Dawes, 2006; Dana, Weber and Kuang, 2007) has found
that knowledge of context and observability of decisions matter since it allows
the recipient (and, more generally, a third party or audience) to assess the moral
appropriateness of the sharer’s decision. In turn, feelings of pride, guilt, or shame
may influence the sharer’s decision making.
24One may also, instead of zero opportunity cost of giving, think of our game as capturing a
situation where the costs of giving are very small.
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We think the empirical relevance of costless sharing is significant. Examples
include emailing presentation slides, sharing documents, and more generally sharing
valuable information, knowledge, and advice with someone else.25 While it typically
has been costly to produce or obtain these resources in the first place, once they are
there it is free to share them with other people. We believe that, surprisingly, we do
not currently have any data that allows us to answer the question, how much will be
shared? Will moral and social arguments remain to be important, or will subjects
seek efficiency even in the absence of such arguments, as a result of sharing being
costless? Of course, in the real world sharing decisions will depend on a myriad of
contextual and institutional factors. These include: social distance, strategic factors
based on repeated game interaction, signalling and reputation building, the presence
of a principal who can condition monetary rewards and punishment on sharing, and
so on. We think all these factors can be studied in future work.
3.2 Related Literature
In this section, we first review closely related studies on intrinsic and extrinsic
motivation in the dictator game, where giving is costly. Subsequently, we focus
on the existing literature on costless sharing.
3.2.1 Dictator Game Giving
Moral reasoning in the DG has been documented in experiments where the dictator
produces the surplus (see e.g. Cherry, Frykblom and Shogren, 2002; Cherry and
Shogren, 2008; Oxoby and Spraggon, 2008; Carlsson, He and Martinsson, 2013;
Rodriguez-Lara and Moreno-Garrido, 2012; Cappelen et al., 2017; Thunström et al.,
2016), instead of receiving it exogenously (windfall income, or “manna from heaven”).
For example, Cherry, Frykblom and Shogren (2002) find that the dictator gives
substantially less (often zero) to the recipient when the dictator has generated the
surplus by performing a real effort task, compared to when the surplus has been
provided by the experimenters. Oxoby and Spraggon (2008) find the same, and also
show that when the recipient has produced the surplus, the recipient is given much
more than in the usual DG (see also Carlsson, He and Martinsson, 2013; Cherry
and Shogren, 2008; Ruffle, 1998). Cappelen et al. (2017) observe that the dictator
gives more when both have performed a real effort task, compared to when only
the dictator has. Cherry and Shogren (2008) as well as Mittone and Ploner (2012)
show that not only the legitimisation of assets through effort but also the perceived
25In many cases, sharing presentation slides, documents, advice etc. is beneficial to the sender; in
many other cases it is costly. We model an environment where the sharing of resources is beneficial
to the recipient and neither beneficial nor costly to the sharer which allows us to investigate whether
subjects are averse to sharing per se.
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deservingness of receivers play an important role explaining the discussed findings.
These studies report behaviour in line with a moral motivation for giving.
In contrast to an intrinsic moral motivation, evidence also suggests that many
people are motivated by extrinsic social motivation which is our second area of
interest. A dictator who is known by the recipient (or others) to have had the
opportunity to give in a situation where giving appears to be morally justified and
who did not do so may feel shame or guilt, and anticipating such feelings may lead
the dictator to give more, compared to when the recipient would not know that the
dictator had an opportunity to give. Giving may also be motivated by pride which
results from leaving a positive impression on others. There is now a well-established
literature documenting that observability and extrinsic motivation matter (see e.g.
Andreoni and Petrie, 2004; Andreoni and Bernheim, 2009; Ariely, Bracha and Meier,
2009; Bohnet and Frey, 1999; Bursztyn and Jensen, 2017; Chaudhuri, 2011; Dana,
Cain and Dawes, 2006; Ekström, 2012; Fehr and Gächter, 2000; Rege, 2004; Rege
and Telle, 2004; Soetevent, 2005; Tadelis, 2011).
A shortcoming of the existing literature is that it focuses almost exclusively on
studies where giving is costly. In this paper, we wish to assess whether the same
forces that motivate giving in the dictator game also play a role when resources can
be shared at no cost.
3.2.2 Costless Sharing
The literature on costless sharing is pretty scarce, especially when compared to the
significant research that has been dedicated to the analysis of the dictator game.
We believe we are the first to experimentally study the role of moral reasoning and
extrinsic social motivation in a situation where a resource has been produced via a
real effort task and can be shared at no (or negligible) personal cost.
The closest studies of costless sharing we are aware of use the Generosity Game
(GG) (see Güth, 2010; Güth, Levati and Ploner, 2012).26 In this game, the dictator
chooses the size p of a “pie”, where his own pie amount is fixed at x with p ≥ x and
p ≤ p where p is the largest feasible pie size. The dictator thus chooses p ∈ [x, p]
where it is assumed that 2x < p (such that it is possible for the dictator to increase
the recipient’s payoff above his own). It is experimentally found that a majority of
dictators choose the largest pie size thereby favouring efficient and disadvantageous
inequality over inefficient equality.27 Follow-up studies using variations of the GG
observe similar results. García-Gallego, Georgantzis and Ruiz-Martos (2019) allow
26In what follows, we describe the Dictator Game version; there is also an Ultimatum Game
version, where the recipient can reject the proposer’s suggestion. The Envy Game (Casal et al.,
2012; Bäker et al., 2015) is a cousin of the Generosity Game.
27According to a type classification, 44.37% of dictators can be regarded as efficiency seeking,
24.72% as inequality averse, and only 3.47% show competitive preferences.
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for costless giving and taking in the so-called Heaven Dictator Game and find that
the dominance of efficiency seeking persists. Bäker et al. (2014) auction off the
proposer and responder roles in a GG. They observe that this makes participants
care even more for efficiency than for equality compared to when roles are randomly
assigned. An exception stems from a three-person generosity experiment by Güth
et al. (2010). Here, it is observed that efficiency seeking falls behind equity seeking if
general equality is achievable while the opposite is true if inequality is unavoidable.
Our study differs from the discussed literature by introducing moral arguments
for and against sharing. The studies using the GG let all money amounts be
exogenously given, so moral arguments involving entitlement or desert are absent.
Rather, the dictator must decide whether to implement an equal but inefficient
distribution, or an unequal but total earnings maximising one. In contrast, we
consider the role of moral reasoning based on salient costly effort from producing the
surplus. We hypothesise that the salience of effort costs generates moral entitlements
that make people unwilling to share the entire surplus with the other player. We
moreover think that the significant generosity observed in previous studies could
have been affected by subjects’ concerns over how their actions are perceived by
other players or the experimenter. Our study is particularly suited to minimise
such concerns as we conduct our experiment in an online environment where the
anonymity of decisions is strengthened. To obtain insights into the relevance of
extrinsic social motivation, we vary the information that recipients receive about
the context of the sharer’s decision and the origin of the shared surplus.
There is a large literature on helping behaviour and organisational citizenship
behaviour in teams, companies, and organisations (see LePine, Erez and Johnson,
2002). Our contribution differs from these in several ways. First, many of these
studies rely on questionnaire evidence. Second, the only incentivised experiment
that we are aware of (see Danilov, Harbring and Irlenbusch, 2019), considers mutual
helping in groups, where helping is costly since it takes time away from other
activities. We deliberately focus on costless helping and only allow one person
in the group to help. Third, as already mentioned above, important considerations
such as reciprocity in helping and repeated interaction are deliberately kept out of
our study. These can be considered in future work.
3.3 The Experiment
3.3.1 Design
Subjects in our experiment are assigned to one of two possible roles: sharer or
recipient. For logistical reasons, sharers were recruited first; they were able to
influence earnings of recipients in a later session of the experiment.
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Sharers encountered a production stage and a subsequent distribution phase in
their experiment. The task in the production stage was borrowed from Cappelen
et al. (2017) asking subjects to tick off numbers in a series of tables for up to
8 minutes. The goal was to reach a minimum performance threshold which we
deliberately chose such that it would be straightforward for most subjects to complete
the task successfully.28 Completing the task (whether successful or not) was described
to subjects as a requirement to proceed with the experiment and to receive their
participation fee; we did not mention anything about task related rewards at this
stage. After having completed the task successfully, sharers were informed that they
received a bonus of 100 experimental tokens for their performance. They were also
told that each token was worth £0.05 and that the total worth of their tokens would
be paid out to them in pounds, together with their participation fee, at the end of
the experiment.
In the subsequent distribution phase, sharers were for the first time informed
about the costless sharing opportunity and the existence of recipients. Sharers were
told that they could “copy and give” any number x of their earned tokens to the
other person, where x ∈ [0, 100]. If a copy was made, it had to be given to the
other person; it couldn’t be kept. At this point, sharers were also assigned to one
of four treatment conditions which varied (i) whether the recipient would also work
on the number task and (ii) the information that the recipient would receive about
the sharer’s experiment. Table 3.1 summarises our 2x2 factorial treatment design.
In the Both Work conditions, sharers are told that they will be matched with a
recipient who will have successfully completed the same task they did but who
will not be rewarded for it. In contrast to this, the Sharer Works conditions tell
subjects that they will be matched with a recipient who has not participated
in the production stage at all.
In the Full Information conditions, sharers are told that recipients will be
provided with detailed information regarding the origin of the shared amount
and the role played by the sharer. In contrast to this, the No Information
conditions tell sharers that recipients receive the shared amount without any
accompanying explanation.
Table 3.1: Factorial Treatment Design
Full Information No Information
Both Work BW_FI BW_NI
Sharer Works SW_FI SW_NI
28Appendix 3.A contains the instructions and decision screens.
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After sharers submitted their sharing decision, we asked them to provide an
explanation for why they made that choice. We also collected demographic data on
age and gender.
3.3.2 Hypotheses
3.3.2.1 Intrinsic Moral Motivation
Equity theory and theories of desert (see for example Adams, 1965; Hoffman and
Spitzer, 1985; Güth, 1994; Konow, 2003; Selten, 1978) stipulate that the resource
should be shared in proportion to inputs. In Sharer Works, only the sharer has
worked on the number task which means that the recipient can be considered
undeserving of the surplus. This gives sharers a justification not to share. In Both
Work, the recipient can be seen as having exerted the same effort in the number task
as the sharer. This, coupled with the fact that the recipient was not rewarded for
his effort, makes him deserving of being shared with, thus more should be shared.
Since these moral arguments do not depend on the information condition (FI or NI),
we can state the following hypothesis:
Hypothesis 1: More will be shared in the BW compared to the SW conditions.
3.3.2.2 Extrinsic Social Motivation
The findings on moral wiggle room in dictator games (see for example Dana,
Weber and Kuang, 2007) show that many dictators give significant amounts, not
because they want to (intrinsic moral motivation), but because they feel compelled to
(extrinsic social motivation). In the No Information conditions, extrinsic motivation
based on shame and pride is ruled out since the recipient receives no information
about the origin of the received amount or the sharer’s experiment. In the Full
Information conditions, the receiver does receive detailed information about the
sharer’s role in determining the received amount, thus shame and pride can motivate
sharing. We can state the following hypothesis:
Hypothesis 2: More will be shared in the FI compared to the NI conditions.
3.3.3 Procedures
The experiment was programmed using oTree (Chen, Schonger and Wickens, 2016)
and deployed online using the recruitment platform Prolific (www.prolific.co). We
pre-registered the experiment on AsPredicted (www.aspredicted.org) with reference
#45868. Participants were current UK residents with English as their first language.
The first session was run in August 2020 and involved the recruitment of all 240
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sharers. The second session which involved the recipients was run in September
2020. The experiment was combined with an unrelated survey experiment which
took place after the CSG in the sharers experiment and before the CSG in the
recipients experiment. The CSG in the sharers experiment lasted approximately 10
minutes, average earnings were £6.85, including a participation fee of £2. 53% of
our participants were female, the average age was 34 years.
3.4 Results
We start this section by reporting the results of our full sample. We then conduct
a supplementary analysis considering only subjects who – based on their control
question responses – demonstrated that they understood the instructions of the
experiment. Unless otherwise stated, reported Z statistics reflect Wilcoxon rank
sum tests (see Siegel and Castellan, 1988).
3.4.1 Main Results
Almost all subjects (97%) successfully completed the numbers task. The average
completion time was just under 4 minutes (237 seconds).
Table 3.2 provides summary statistics of the number of tokens shared in each
treatment. The associated distributions are shown in Figure 3.1. Overall, there
appears to be little reluctance to share. Our test of hypothesis 1 yields a null result:
there are no statistically significant differences in observed sharing between the BW
and SW conditions. This holds for the comparison of treatments BW_FI with
SW_FI where the observed differences go in the opposite direction of what was
predicted (76.6 vs. 89.0; Z = 0.421; p = 0.210, one-tailed) and for the comparison of
treatments BW_NI with SW_NI where the direction is in line with the prediction
(78.8 vs. 70.9; Z = 1.102; p = 0.135, one-tailed). We state the following result:
Result 1. There is no significant difference in sharing detected between the BW
and SW conditions.
Table 3.2: Summary Statistics of Tokens Shared
Treatment Mean Std. Dev. n
BW_FI 76.6 39.9 59
SW_FI 89.0 22.5 58
BW_NI 78.8 33.6 57
SW_NI 70.9 40.5 58
Total 78.8 35.3 232
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With respect to hypothesis 2, we find support in the Sharer Works conditions,
not however in the Both Work conditions. There are no significant differences
detected between treatments BW_FI and BW_NI (76.6 vs. 78.8; Z = 0.034; p =
0.487; one-tailed). In contrast, sharing in treatment SW_FI is significantly higher
compared to treatment SW_NI (89.0 vs. 70.9; Z = 2.172; p = 0.015; one-tailed).
We state the following result:
Result 2. Significantly more is shared in treatment SW_FI than SW_NI. There is
no significant difference in sharing detected between treatments BW_FI and BW_NI.
The relatively low sharing observed in treatment BW_FI is somewhat surprising
to us, given that the combination of a moral argument for sharing and the provision
of full information was expected to generate most sharing. To better understand
the motives behind sharing, we investigated how subjects justified their decisions in
the written explanations they provided.
Table 3.3 reports the results of a text categorisation. Many text justifications
refer to sharing being costless, morally appropriate or kind. As intended by design,
moral arguments for sharing based on entitlement are much more pronounced in
the BW compared to the SW conditions according to Fisher’s exact tests (full
information: 28.8% vs. 8.6%, p < 0.01; no information: 26.3% vs. 3.4%, p <
0.01). As an illustration, subject #85 in the BW condition shares 100 tokens and
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Table 3.3: Classification of Written Explanations
BW_FI BW_NI SW_FI SW_NI
Moral Argument 28.8% 26.3% 8.6% 3.4%
Costless 45.8% 47.4% 60.3% 51.7%
Generous/Kind 52.5% 50.9% 74.1% 67.2%
Reciprocal 10.2% 5.3% 6.9% 1.7%
Surprise 5.1% 3.5% 10.3% 12.1%
Other/Unspecific 6.8% 7.0% 10.3% 12.1%
Misunderstanding 10.2% 10.5% 3.4% 6.9%
n 59 58 57 58
writes “We both did the experiment correctly, but the other person received no
tokens so I have equalled us out, hopefully!”. In contrast, subject #58 in the SW
condition shares 25 tokens and writes “Because I did something to actually earn
mine and they did not. I was still willing to be charitable but not completely”.
Since moral arguments for sharing are nearly absent in the SW condition, subjects
more often justify their sharing in that condition as an act of generosity or kindness
(full information: 74.1% vs. 52.5%, p = 0.021; no information: 67.2% vs. 50.9%,
p = 0.089).29 We don’t find any further between-treatment differences across the
remaining categories.
Another insight from the text analysis is that roughly 7.8% (18 of 232) of texts
reveal some misunderstanding of the features of the game, most notably related to
sharing being costless. A closer look at the sharing behaviour of subjects whose
justifications were classified to reveal misunderstanding shows substantially lower
sharing amounts compared to the remaining subgroup (26.8 compared to 83.2 shared
tokens on average). To obtain a cleaner picture of subjects’ willingness to share
which attempts to correct for distortions in the data due to misunderstanding, we
next conduct a supplementary analysis focusing on subjects who demonstrated in
the control question stage that they understood the rules of the experiment.
3.4.2 Supplementary Results
Before subjects were given the opportunity to share, we presented them with a set
of three control questions which tested their understanding of the core features of
our design: (i) sharing being costless, (ii) the recipient exerting effort or not, and
(iii) the recipient receiving information or not. For the specifics such as the exact
phrasing of the questions, we refer the reader to Appendix 3.A.
29 Two out of 115 subjects in the SW conditions perceive the receiver as deserving because he
or she was not given an opportunity to work on the task.
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Table 3.4: Control Question Attempts
First attempt? Question 1 Question 2 Question 3
True 77.6% 76.3% 83.2%
False 22.4% 23.7% 16.8%
n 232 232 232
For each control question, we recorded a binary variable in the experiment telling
us whether a subject found the correct solution to a given question on the first try
or not. Table 3.4 summarises the findings. For the remainder of the analysis, we
consider only those subjects who correctly answered all three control questions on
the first try, i.e. without making any mistakes. This approach could be considered
extreme as it likely overstates the degree of misunderstanding in our experiment by
also excluding subjects who learned from their mistakes. We however prefer this
approach over excluding subjects based on a subjective evaluation of their writing.
Table 3.5 and Figure 3.2 reproduce the statistics from the previous analysis
for the reduced sample. It is evident that for the subsample, there is even less
reluctance to share than for the full sample. Again, we observe no statistically
significant differences in observed sharing between treatments BW_FI and SW_FI
(95.2 vs. 93.1; Z = 1.235; p = 0.158; one-tailed). However we do find mild evidence
that less is shared in treatment SW_NI than BW_NI (90.8 vs. 79.3; Z = 1.469; p
= 0.068; one-tailed).
Result 3. (Reduced Sample) There is mild evidence that more is shared in treatment
BW_NI than SW_NI. There is no significant difference in sharing detected between
treatments BW_FI and SW_FI.
Regarding the role of information, there is no significant difference induced by
providing information in the BW conditions (95.2 vs. 90.8; Z = 1.334; p = 0.145,
Table 3.5: Summary Statistics of Tokens Shared (Reduced Sample)
Treatment Mean Std. Dev. n
BW_FI 95.2 19.1 31
SW_FI 93.1 17.0 35
BW_NI 90.8 20.2 33
SW_NI 79.3 35.9 35
Total 90.4 25.1 134
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one-tailed). There however is a mild difference when considering the SW conditions
(93.1 vs. 79.3; Z = 1.624; p = 0.049, one-tailed).
Result 4. (Reduced Sample) There is mild evidence that more is shared in treatment
SW_FI than SW_NI. There is no significant difference in sharing detected between
treatments BW_FI and BW_NI.
The results of the supplementary analysis have to be considered with caution as
they are based on fewer observations. Nevertheless, the findings are by and large
consistent with those obtained when considering the full sample. First of all, there
is very little reluctance to share when sharing is costless. Second of all, there is
evidence that the combination of the SW and NI features of our experiment reduces
sharing, albeit by a small amount.
3.5 Discussion
The literature on costless sharing is pretty scarce and has predominantly considered
environments where moral arguments for sharing played a negligible role. In the
closely related Generosity Game for example, subjects are endowed with “manna
from heaven”; it therefore comes as no surprise to us that subjects in the GG tend
to be remarkably generous and show very little reluctance to increase a recipient’s
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earnings. In our experiment, sharers had to earn their endowments with their effort,
thereby strengthening the legitimacy of their assets. In addition to this, we varied
the deservingness of the recipient by setting up conditions where the recipient had
to exert a similar effort to that of the sharer as opposed to having exerted no effort
at all. Despite our deservingness manipulations, we observe very little reluctance
to costlessly share earned wealth with a recipient. Quite interestingly however, we
do observe a tendency for sharing to be lower in treatments where the receiver is
both undeserving and receives no information about the existence of the sharer. A
similar interaction effect has been observed by Cappelen et al. (2017) in the context
of a dictator game where sharing was costly. In their experiment, extrinsic social
motivation plays out more strongly when the dictator perceives that there exists a
moral argument for giving and we think the same may be true in our costless sharing
experiment.
We think follow-up research could investigate whether a stronger reluctance to
costlessly share could be observed under conditions which push the perception of
receiver undeservingess even further, e.g. by implementing a protocol similar to
that of Cherry and Shogren (2008) who let the recipient be someone who actively
decided to opt out of the experiment. Another exciting research project could
apply techniques similar to those used in the previous chapters of this thesis to
investigate whether opportunities to self-deceive about the cause of a missed sharing
opportunity decrease sharing.
3.6 Conclusion
We presented the results of an online experiment which implemented the Costless
Sharing Game. In this game, a sharer first earns a resource by completing an effort
task and is then offered the opportunity to share the resource at no personal cost
with another person, the recipient. We used the CSG to consider how the amount
shared depends on moral reasoning based on entitlement and desert (“intrinsic moral
motivation”) and on whether the context of the decision of the sharer is known by
the recipient (“extrinsic social motivation”).
Our results indicate that the remarkably high generosity observed in previous
experiments which allowed subjects to increase others’ earnings at no personal
cost extends to environments such as ours, where moral arguments for sharing are
manipulated. Interestingly, we also found mild evidence of an interaction between
our treatment conditions which indicates less sharing when neither intrinsic moral
nor extrinsic social arguments for sharing are present.
We think that especially the latter finding warrants further research as to whether
such an interaction is a robust feature of costless sharing. But so far, the evidence
points towards remarkably little reluctance to share when sharing costs are removed.
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